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a  monthly  digest 
EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
General Directorate of Pari iamentary 
Documentation and  Information This publication deals with problems relating to 
the progress of European integration: it analyses note-
worthy attitudes taken and articles written on these 
issues.  It also reports on the efforts pursued by the 
European Parliament, the Parliaments of the Six 
Member States and by other European parliamentary 
bodies with a view to achieving the aim of uniting 
Europe. 
For further information on some of the problems 
tackled by the European Communities and,  in par-
ticular,  on the work of the Executives,  readers are 
referred to the following official publications 
Bulletin of the European Coal and Steel Community 
Bulletin of the European Economic Community 
Euratom-Bulletin of the European Atomic Energy 
Com1nunity 
The Council of Ministers issues a press release 
at the dose of its sessions.  Its activities, however, 





DEVELOPMENT  OF  EUROPEAN  INTEGRATION 
GENERAL  PROBLEMS .............••..•........•........•. 
1.  European affairs and General de Gaulle's press conference 









of Western Europe .............••............••....... 
Mr.  Spaak and Mr. Giscard d'Estaing and progress in the 
making of Europe ...•......•.........•...•...•........ 
European choice of the Italian Socialists ................  . 
Eighteenth Round-Table Conference in Hamburg  ........  . 
Seventh Congress of the Social Democrat parties of the 
European Communities ....................••.......... 
Sixteenth Ordinary Congress of the 'Europe-Union' of 
Germany in Baden-Baden ..•........................... 
Europe's world responsibilities - declaration  by the Euro-
pean Movement ...........  , ..............•............ 
Conference of the European Union of Christian Democrats 
held at Rome on 18 December 1966  ....•..........•..... 
Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani's visit to the Federal Re-


















The UNICE  and European integration  ..............•.... 
For a European scientific and technical research policy  .. 
Italian industrialists and the Kennedy-Round ............  . 
Committee of Professional Agricultural Organizations 




31 page  ~ 
III.  EXTERNAL  RELATIONS  . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . .  33 
I. 
L  The Spanish Minister for the Development Plan and the inte-
gration of Spain in the Common Market  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  33 
2.  Germ~y  and Spain's association with the Common Market  34 
Part  II 
PARLIAMENTARY ACTIVITY 
EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
a)  Work of the Committees in December 1966  .............  . 
b)  Parliamentary conference of the Association 
The Third meeting of the Conference (Abidjan, 10-14 Decem-




II.  ASSEMBLY  OF  THE  WESTERN  EUROPEAN  UNION  . . . . . . . .  45 
WEU Assembly and the problems raised by the possible ac-
cession of the United Kingdom to the European Communities  45 
Ill.  NATIONAL  PARLIAMENTS .. . . . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. . .. . . ..  47 
a)  Germany  47 
Government declaration by Federal Chancellor Kiesinger and 
European policy  .....................................  .  47 
b)  Italy  49 
Mr.  Fanfani, Foreign Minister,  addresses the Italian 
Chamber of Deputies on technological policy and Europe . . .  49 
c)  Netherlands  .........................................  .  50 
1.  Adoption by the First Chamber of the Treaty for the 
merger  . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  50 
2.  European policy  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  51 




Part  I 
DEVELOPMENT  OF  EUROPEAN  INTEGRATION 
I.  GENERAL  PROBLEMS 
1.  European affairs and General de Gaulle's press conference 
At his press conference on 28 October,  the President of the French Republic 
repeated his concept of Europe : 'Our concept of Europe and our action in 
Europ~ are,  of course, our own,  but are not directed against anyone; indeed, 
we believe them to be useful to all, 
It is true that their basis is Europe as it is, and not Europe as it might have 
been imagined to be but is not. It is true that what we are trying to do is to 
serve Europe's interests and not interests foreign to Europe. It is true that we 
consider it desirable for our continent itself to organize, from one end of its 
lit  territory to the other,  d~tente, understanding and co-operation.  But we do not 
believe there is anything there that need,  in short,  run counter to anyone's in-
terests.  This is the principle that underlies our European policy, whether in 
our relations with Germany, our enemy of yesterday, or in our efforts to 
bring about an economic and,  if possible,  a political grouping of Western 
Europe or to reach agreement and associate with the East European coun-
tries.' 
After emphasizing that the European Common Market was now organized, the 
President recalled that  'again and again it was the firm and clear-cut action 
taken by our public authorities that saved the enterprise from straying down 
paths leading nowhere. '  General de Gaulle referred to  the suspension of ne-
gotiations with the United Kingdom as a  case in point, for  'these negotiations 
were well and truly preventing the Six from building their Community.'  'This 
was again the case in Brussels in 1965 when we had to suspend talks that ap-
peared to be on the point of succeeding but in fact did not because, at the de-
cisive moment, the completion of the common agricultural market, which was 
necessary for us, was called into question, and because we were asked to ac-
cept a serious surrender of sovereignty.  Yet,  after a certain amount of com-
motion,  our attitude proved to be highly salutary as it substantially contrib-
uted to the decision of the Six to adopt this year all the essential regulations 
concerning agriculture which had till then been left pending,  and to take cogni-
zance of the fact that henceforth the reversal of decisions will require a unan-
imous vote,  in other words,  France's  endorsement.  Clearly, by defending 
- 1 -her own interests in this way France has served those of the Community,  if  , 
only by safeguarding it when it was in danger of breaking down. 
After all, PQlitical co-operation between the States that are members of the 
Community is certainly indispensable if the EEC is to endure and to go on de-
-.reloping.  We have stopped proposing that such co-operation should be gradu- l 
ally organized on the sole condition that it aims at defining and following a  1 
policy that is European and not at conforming, necessarily and on principle,to  I 
a policy that is not.  It is this condition that has so far prevented the adoption 
of the French plan,  although no other has been put forward.  Yet directly one 
speaks of Europe, who can fail to recognize that France has done everything  ~ 
- other than indulging in empty speeches - to ensure its birth and development, 
starting out from the West? ·Furthermore, even if the economic grouping of 
the Six is one day rounded off on the political plane, nothing worthwhile or en-
during can be done for Europe until agreement is reached between its peoples 
in the West and its peoples in the East. 
In particular, the solution of a problem as grave as that of Germany's future 
is not otherwise conceivable.  As for the development and the spread of the in-
fluence of our continent, which are at present held in check by its division, 
what giant strides they would make in a united Europe  ~'  (Le Monde,  30-31 
October 1966) 
2.  The President of the United States of America and the unity of 
Western Europe 
At the National Conference of Editorial Writers on 7 October 1966, President 
L. B.  Johnson pledged America's best efforts to support movement toward 
Western European unity.  'The outlines of the new Europe, he said, were 
clearly discernible.  It is a stronger, increasingly united but open Europe -
with Great Britain a part of it - and with close ties to America.'  He stressed 
that a united Western Europe could be  'our equal partner in helping to build a 
peaceful and just world order. ' It could move more confidently in peaceful in-
itiatives toward the East and provide a framework within which a unified 
Germany could be a full partner without arousing ancient fears. 
'One great goal of a united West, the Prestdent said, is to heal the wound in 
Europe which now cuts East from West and brother from brother.  That divi-
sion must be healed peacefully.  It must be healed with the consent of Eastern 
European countries and the Soviet Union. ' 
'Nothing is more important for peace.  We must improve the East-West envi-
ronment in order to achieve the unification of Germany in the context of a 







to do their part.  Under the last four Presidents, our policy towards the Sovi~t 
Union has been the same.  Where necessary we shall defend freedom - where 
possible we shall work with the East to build a· lasting peace. 
1 
'We must turn to one of the great unfinished tasks of our generation -making 
Europe whole.  The maintenance of old enmities is not in anyone's interest. Our 
aim is a true European reconciliation  ..... We must make this clear to the East. 
1 
1 In a restored Europe, Germany can and will be united.  This remains a vital 
purpose of American policy.  It can only be accomplished through a growing 
reconciliation.  There is no shortcut. 
1  (Le Monde,  9-10 October 1966) 
3.  Mr.  Spaak and Mr.  Giscard d'Estaing and progress in the making of 
Europe 
In a statement made to the 
1 Le 20e  Si~cle ',  Mr.  Spaak analysed the present 
state of Europe : ' For 20 years Europe has been living under the joint, indis-
sociable, dispensation of an Atlantic Alliance and a progressive unification. 
As a result Europe, once so blood-stained and shaken, today enjoys peace and 
a hitherto unknown prosperity.  Would it not be absurd and even dangerous to 
weaken such a system and to change order into disorder? 
I remember that in 1957 those,  including myself, who signed the  Treaty of 
Rome, were not thinking solely of the Common Market ; they were working, 
it was true, for a change for the better in the economies of their countries but 
they also realized they were taking a vital step towards the European political 
union.  Perhaps they were a little too optimistic ;  they .let tbemselves be car-
ried along by a certain historic fatalism and were more or less convinced that 
economic integration needs must lead to political unity.  Today we are bound 
to acknowledge that,  although the economic progress made has exceeded our 
hopes, the same has not been true politically and even the European spirit is 
'on the wane. 
1  Building Europe 
1  is not just a question of settling the price of 
wheat,  the production of sugar or the import of American chickens ; it is tak-
ing part with one mind in a  common approach to the key issues facing Europe 
and the world.  May I add that if this spirit should falter or disappear, it is not 
certain that the present economic progress would continue or even that the re-
sults already achieved would be maintained.  This is why I say, as I have done 
in the past, that 1)  to achieve the economic unity of Europe, we must have  a 
supranational type of authority,  and 2)  that economic union is in the long-term 
inconceivable without political union. 
With reference to the first point, we have only to reflect on the difficulties encoun-
tered by the Six among themselves and on what will happen,  when  at some 
future  stage,  the Six become Eight or Ten or Twelve . • • • . .  Obviously,  the 
- 3 -greater the number of partners, the greater will be the number of problems 
and the more difficult these will be to solve - because if unanimity is not easy 
for Six,  it is much less easy for Twelve.  This is a dilemma that we cannot 
escape : either the Community will become paralyzed or else it must be  en-
dowed with a  supranational authority.  It is worth emphasizing that while we 
may criticize  candidates for accession for not making up their minds,  the Six· 
themselves have not been very sure of their own position since the Luxembourg 
compromise at the beginning of this year  because this ultimately rests on 
their finding that five members are keeping faith with a treaty that the sixth 
refused to apply ......  . 
The close relationship between economics and politics is equally clear. 
Economic integration cannot be carried all the way through unless there is a 
common policy basis.  I must admit that I do not understand those who claim 
that they accept economic unity but reject political unity. Do they not realize to 
what limitations, to what impossibilities they are condemning themselves  ? 
Take the fiscal system, European currency or  even Community planning; 
nothing of this can be achieved between countries whose defence and foreign 
policies either differ or clash.  Here too one example is enough : the common 
agricultural policy.  This costs Germany a  great deal.  Would Germany agree 
if her five partners dissociated themselves from the German desire for  re-
unification ?  Sacrifices are inconceivable except in a general spirit of soli-
darity.  The alternative is inevitably national egotism.  There is here a close 
link between the building of Europe and the Atlantic Alliance.  If the Six have 
so far made some progress towards political union,  it has been because they 
have, through NATO,  taken the same course in the sphere of defence. 
One last point.  In 19.1:5  Mr.  Byrnes, Secretary of State,  said to me :  'The 
Russians prefer three-way talks to four-way talks,  and two-way talks to three-
way talks.'  For twenty years the Americans have resisted the temptation. If 
they no longer believe in European unity and if they become resigned to the 
fact that our continent will fall back into disorder, they will deal directly -and 
above our heads - with Moscow.  There will,  no doubt,  be peace, but we shall 
no longer count for anything in the world.  There is only one way in whi~h this 
risk can be parried :through a united Europe, the partner of the USA  within 
the Atlantic Alliance. 
For his part, Mr.  V.  Giscard d'Estaing,  in an interview with the same news-
paper,  si:ated his' attitude to the pursuit of the making of Europe :  ' .......  We 
cannot found the existential,  resolutely forward-looking,Europe  that we have 
to build,  on the tenuous realities, the undefined potential of the State or super-
State.  The existentiarEurope leads to the organic, living Europe and it is 
made up of the local authorities, the regions, Communities and institutions of 
every kind,  and also,  of course, of the national States because they are one 
aspect among many of the existential reality of Europe.  All these constituent 
parts must be allowed scope to evolve under the pressure of realities and to 
change in order to face up to the imperatives of a new situation or a new prob-





The organic Europe is the corollary of the existential Europe.  Only the exist-
ential Europe can protect European thinking from sclerosis,  and only the 
organic Europe can stop the European Society from becoming set in its ways 
and imperious to change.' 
Mr.  Giscard d'Estaing thought that the progress of the political Europe de-
pended  on/the development of institutions : 'To make the political Europe 
progress involves injecting into the existing institutions some feature which 
will ensure their convergence while at the same time respecting their prerog-
atives.' He considered that  'against the baC'kground of the existential Europe', 
an assembly elected by universal suffrage 'is not a  solution because it would 
immediately throw up  two conflicts.  Firstly, there would be a conflict of law : 
who  would make the law ?  The national assembly elected  by universal suffrage ? 
Secondly there would be a clash between individuals. Who  would be represent-
ative  ?  Would it be the French, the Germans,  the Italians,  elected within the 
framework of a national assembly, or would it be those elected in a European 
assembly ?  In short,  an assembly elected by universal suffrage is the expras-
sion of a principle,  and this principle is that of decisions taken by a majority. 
Who  can say, however, whether at Europe's present stage of development, 
decisions can be taken and put into effect through the simple agency of a ma-
jority ?  What sort of European majority could there be  ?  Who would constrain 
the ntir,ority to speak a language other  than their own  ?  What European ma-
jority could exist and change the statute or right to exist of the political par-
ties or the trade unions  ?  In reality, at this stage in the existential Europe, we 
are none of us ready,  when we  are in a minority position,  to submit to the 
decisions of the majority. 
We  must therefore go forward on another course,  and this is why I think that 
the first institution to establish is a European Senate.  European senators 
should be elected in the second degree by the locally elected in the same way 
as our French senators are at the moment,  but within the framework of re-
gional lists which would mean that we could,  for the first time,  use this elec-
toral constituency.  This is the existential Europe, but it is also the organic 
Europe because the region would become one of the key components of Euro-
pean society.  This senate would furthermore have to be made up consistently 
with the balance already operative in the EEC.  According to the Treaty of 
Rome,  of course, each country has a certain number of votes on the Council 
of Ministers in Brussels.  France and Germany have the same number of votes 
and the other countries have a weighted number.  The number of senators for 
each country would be determined in relation to this voting key. 
The European Senate would be asked to give a second reading to all national 
legislative texts whose convergence and harmonization between States mightbe 
thought desirable : taxation,  social security charges, commercial law, labour 
law.  Debates might be organized on defence,. foreign policy and economicpoli-
cy.  The Senate would examine the texts coming within its terms of reference 
after a first reading by the national Parliaments,  and would have the right  to 
make amendments.  The Senate might, by a  qualified majority,  require a 
- 5-second Community deliberation.  The national Parliaments would be the  autho~ 
ity in the last instance.  This Senate would be the first stage in a development 
we could pursue to  make Europe.' 
T9 obtain this Senate, Mr.  Giscard d'Estaing felt 'we shouldfirstof allhave to 
have a meeting.of the Heads of State and Government to discuss it.  We  should 
then have to  have changes in the national constitutions so that if this were 
necessary (in the case of France particularly), it could be approved by refer-
endum.  Lastly it would be a development whereby we should have all the nec-
essary guarantees because we should need a constitutional decision on the part 
of each State to carry forward the developments thus initiated.  This is the 
kind of solution and the kind of proposal which leads me to suggest this design, 
both existential and organic,  of Europe.'  (Le 20e  Si~cle, December .1966) 
4.  European choice of the Italian Socialists 
On 30 October the two Italian Socialist parties - the PSI (Italian Socialist Par-
ty) and the PSDI  ( Italian Social Democrat Party )  - became united.  The  So-
cialist "onstituent assembly,  meeting at Rome,  approved both the creation of 





ical action and organization', the ideological charter of the united party.  ' 
The constituent assembly followed  congresses held at Rome by each of the 
two parties which ratified the union,  - the 37th congress of the PSI from 27  to 
29 October and the 15th Congress of the PSDI on 29 October. At these meetings 
the two parties again dis,..ussed European policy.  The PSDI confined itself to 
recalling the stand on European unity it had decided on at the previous con-
gress (the 14th, held at Rome from 8 to 11 January 1966)  (see EuropeanDocu-
mentation,  February 1966,  p. 1).  A more searching debate was held by the 
PSI.  Mr.  Nenni called for a new drive for European unity.  Mr.  Cattani,  re-
sponsible for the party's foreign affairs section,  described the Socialist Par-
ty as a European party and  added that the  aim of Socialist foreign policy was 
the unity and security of Europe.  He looked forward to a new balance in 
Europe based on three factors :  (i)  a Community revival  and a move forward 
from an economic community to a common concept of international policy; 
(ii) the geographical enlargement of the Community to embrace Great Britain 
and EFTA; (iii) the adoption of a  sound and realistic approach to economic and 
political co-operation between the Community in the West and the Communist 
countries of the East European bloc.  Mr.  Lombardi, leader ofthe Left minor-
ity,  welcomed the party's European pledge, because socialist action could 
only be effective  against a European background. He warned,  however, against 
championing the European cause as a pretext for dodging political and social 
obligations arising from the party's international outlook. 
- 6-~ 
I 
The question of the European pledge came very much to the fore at the con-
stituent assembly.  Mr.  Nenni dwelt on the need for relaunching the drive for 
unity.  'This is a very delicate time,' he  remarked,  'for Europe and for its 
unity.' Progress in the EEC was blocked by the Gaullist attitude in France at 
a time when either (i)  the economic organization of the Six could be extended to 
cover Great Britain and the EFTA countries and the economic community 
would broaden into a political community, or (ii) even what had been achieved 
to date might be imperilled.  This field offered an immense field for initiatives 
by the united party and the International.  There was not,  however,  a minute, 
a  single minute to lose.  In the opinion of Mr.  Tanassi, Secretary of the PSDI, 
the new party and the entire policy of the Italian Left-Centre should play its 
full part in the creation of wider political communities,  starting with the EEC, 
the nucleus of a European and,  ultimately,  of a world design. 
According to Professor Serafini, Secretary-General of the Italian Association 
for the Council of European Municipalities,  the Europe which the united party 
could and should construct could only start out from the nucleus offered by the 
existing Community.  The problem was how to develop it on sufficiently bold 
lines, to transform it into a truly democratic community open to those who 
accepted supranationality,  raising it up  as a pillar of peaceful co-existence 
and demonstrating by its success the rightness of the federalist approach to 
the final overcoming of the balance of terror.  Mr.  Zagari, Under-Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs, held that the united party should pattern its European 
strate~y along the following lines : first, using socialist unity as lever to set 
up a European socialist party based on an overhauled International; secondly, 
working for a larger Europe,  capable of acting as an equal partner to the 
United States, _and  for institutionalized relations between western and eastern 
Europe. 
The constituent assembly then approved the declaration of principles, political 
action and organization. On the subject of Europe  the declaration states : 'It 
(the United Party) is pledged to strive for the unification of Europe - econom-
ically, through the European Economic Community and its extension to Great 
Britain and the EFT  A countries; politically.  starting out from the election by 
universal suffrage of a European Parliament to which ,Community organs would 
be answerable.  In the world of today the lack of European union left a vacuum 
which it was up to Socialists to fill in the interests of pea,.,e.  (Avanti,  28,  29. 
300ktober,  1,  2 november 1966: Mondo operaio, September-October 1966). 
5.  Eighteenth Round-Table Conference in Hamburg 
On 28,  29 and 30 October 1966 the eighteenth Round Table Conference on 
'Germany in Europe today'  was held in Hamburg.  These conferences are ar-
ranged by the 'Gesellschaft zum Studium europaischer Probleme'  (Society for 
- 7 -the study of European problems) whose headquarters are in Paris. Its mem- • 
bers include politicians, industrialists,  scientists and journalists from many 
West European countries. 
The debates centred broadly on four basic reports 
1.  Report by Stanley Henig on Great Britain and the German problem: 
2.  Report by Christian de la MaHme on France and the German ques-
tion; 
3.  Report by Mario Pedini on Germany and the European Economic 
Community: 
4.  Repprt by Wolfgang Schi.itz on Germany's position in Europe today. 
Mr.  Henig,  member of the British House of Commons,  stressed how impor-
tant Germany had always been  to  England as a first line of defence and out-
post.  England had a corresponding importance for Germany.  Reunification 
and thft frontier problem remained the burning topies in the Federal Republic. 
These could only be solved as part of a  European peace between Germany and 
the four powers on the one hand.  and among the four powers themselves on the 
other.  Mr.  Henig saw a  solution of the present standstill in the task of the 
'force de frappe' on the part of Great Britain and France.  in Britain's admis-
sion to the enlarged Common Market and in rethinking German policy towards 
the 'German Democratic Republic'  and the Oder-Neisse  line. 
Mr.  J. B.  Hynd,  member  of  the  House  of  Commons,  dealt  with  the 
relations between Germany and Great Britain at the end of the war when 
Great Britain had pleaded for recognit-ion of a  sound,  democratic Germany. 
He went on to speak of the need for British membership of the Community. 
which was supported by 70 per cent of UK citizens.  Great Britain's admission 
would not affect the political side of the Community. Britain did not want to 
. join the Community purely for the advantages it might derive but because it 
was convinced that Britain could contribute to European progress. 
Lord-Gladwyn,  chairma.11 of the 'Britain in Europe' Movement,  warned that the 
Germans could approach the Soviet Union separately with a view to their coun-
try's reunification.  Arbitrary though the division between the Federal Republic 
and the DDR might be,  the Eastern regime was already improving,  and this 
trend would continue in the future.  According to Lord Gladwyn, the soundest 
arrangement for Europe's immediate future would be for Britain to enter the 
the Community,  as in a Community that included Britain the Federal Republic 
could achieve political equality with other countries. If Great Britain failed to 
gain admittance in the next two or three years, it would have to link up eco-
nomically a1d politically with the USA or other North Atlantic countries - a 






• ~  Mr.  Christian de la Mal~ne, former Minister and Gaullist deputy,  stressed 
that the German question was in French eyes the Eurc;>pean question.  Europe 
remained the key to peace.  The solution lay in easing tensions between the 
East and West; for this reason Germany  would have to set limits on its de-
mands. 
Mr.  Andre Armengaud,  member of the'European Parliament, expressed 
hlghly pessimistic views on present-day Europe and on the position Germany 
pccupied in it.  The position taken up towards the Community by the various 
European States gave,  in his opinion,  the effect of a caricature. It was distin-
guished by resistance,  isolation and defence of national interests.  Against this 
background Germany's behaviour,  too,  was contradictory; on the one hand it 
called for a common coal policy,  on the other it opposed a  common energy 
policy for imports.  It also rejerted any concerted economic policy towards 
non-member countries and looked .upon itself as the United States' favourite 
European partner. This Europe, which he described as a 'dust of nations' could 
become  a united Europe, once large European companies had  been formed, 
legal provisions harmonized,  and the whole atmosphere so changed that Ger-
many ceased to be a  source of crises.  France could help in this connexion by 
restricting its tendency towards independent diplomatic negotiations and by 
showing greater readiness to accept the EEC Commission's help and opinions. 
Mr.  Mario Pedini,  member of the European Parliament,  dwelt on the impor-
tance of the Community framework for the new Germany which had from the 
start regarded the Community as an instrument of economir' and political re-
habilitation.  Since the Luxembourg compromise the Community had undergone 
certain changes.  These induded for example,  a feeling of disappointment, 
particuJ arly. among the Germans,  and an increasing tendency to adopt a prag-
matic approach. The crisis suffered by the Community spirit could only be 
overcome by determined and responsible efforts to revive the idea of integra-
tion.  Turning to the Franco-German Treaty,  Mr.  Pedini stated that a Europe 
based on a sort of Franco-German union was unacceptable.  Not only political 
but also economic problems  caHed for a Community-based solution.  A 
case in point was the problem of coke and coal,  a sector in which,  whatever 
happened, Germany should not be disappointed. 
Mr. Wolfgang Schlitz, chairman of the 'Kuratorium Unteilbares Deutschland' 
(Board of indivisible Germany),  expressed grave doubts about the present 
state of the European cause.  Recalling the four great attempts to build a 
modern Europe (the Europe of the French Revolution,  the Europe of the Holy 
Alliance,  the Europe of Briand and Stresemann,  and that of de Gasperi, 
Schuman,  Adenauer,  Spaak and many others), he attributed the crisis to the 
fact that the Europe built by the founders of the Common Market was a  faint-
hearted affair animated by fear of the communist threat and by the slogan 
'everyone for himself'.  In view of this failure, Mr.  Schlitz showed the way to 
a 'FHth Europe' whieh would mainly be the concern of the younger generati01t 
- 9-
'\ and be distinguished by its supranational character (1).  That generation would. 
have to awake to the need for a measure of pragmatism. It would also have to 
come closer to the countries of the Eastern bloc.  Europe's future lay in be-
coming more outward-looking since by adapting itself to global politics it 
would forget  its old squabbles and attain to higher things.  It was such a 
broad-based Europe,  which would not deny the right of self-determination to 
any country, that the German question would have to be solved.  (Die Welt, 
29 October and 2 November 1966). 
6.  Seventh Congress of the Social Democrat parties of the European 
Communities 
On  17  and  18  November  1966 the Social Democrat parties of the European 
Communities met in Berlin to discuss the domestic and external problems of 
Europe. 
In the <?Pening address Mr.  Willy Brandt expressed his determination to push 
through European development.  The SPD would insist on progress wherever 
this was practicable.  He attached great importance to economic and cultural 
relations with the peoples and States of the Eastern bloc, the magnitude of the 
issues at stake called for more than bilateral efforts.  A common approach was 
today essential.  The SPD felt certain that European union was needed for its 
own sake. It was also necessary for peace,in order to help ease East-West 
tension and to solve the German question.  Mr.  Brandt described the European 
moves of the British Government as a milestone on the road to a larger Euro-
pean Community.  Acceptable transitional arrangements would have to be 
worked out for Britain and for the EFTA States. 
Mr.  Mansholt (Netherlands Social Democrat),  Vice-President of the Brussels 
EEC Commission, pointed out,  in the course of a  speech that was given agood 
reception, that the concept of Europe was not covered by the six Community 
countries.  The EEC' s institutional structure should not, however  ,be sacrificed 
for the sake of an enlarged Community.  Although the success of the Kennedy 
Round could ease trading conditions,  it could not take the place of subsequent 
EEC membership.  As regards the required economic contacts with Eastern 
bloc countries, the growing economic co-operation would not be checked by 
European countries governed centrally up till now under a political system 
rejected by the Six.  The trend towards greater flexibility was leading to rela-
tively independent national communist States which sought economic contacts 
and  showed the first signs of political freedom of movement. 
(1)  Wolfgang SchUtz  : 'Das FUnfte Europa' in 'Europiiische Gemein-
schaft', No.  12,  December 1966,  p.  2 
- 10-Mr.  Mansholt thought the German question was a central problem of future 
r  East-West policy.  It ought now to be ascertained how right or wrong had been 
the post-war decision to admit Germany into a community of Europeanpeoples 
that wished to operate within a democratic structure and to make their con-
tribution to the peaceful progress of the world.  Set against the German need 
for reunification was the justified anxiety of Germany's neighbours about the 
shape of the future policy of a reunited,Germany.  These conflicting attitudes 
could only be reconciled in an integrated Europe. 
Mr.  Herbert Wehner,  Deputy Chairman of the SPD,  opposed the view that 
trends in French policy were the only obstade to political progress in the 
Community.  The problems of the European Communities in the policy of the 
parties must now be the affair of the people.  Energy policy, transport policy 
and other European policy problems should be solved in the interests of the 
European family of peoples rather than by the attempts of individual countries 
to secure maximum advantages. 
Mrs.  Kate Strobel, Chairman of the Socialist Group of the European Parlia-
ment,  submitted a report on the activities of her group over the last two years. 
She examined in detail the progress and setbacks experienced by the EEC 
during that period,  and went on to describe the Socialist Group of the Euro-
pean Parliament as the most resolute political movement fighting against tra-
ditional nationalism and working for European integration.  During the discus-
sions it had been pointed out that nationalistic trends had recently increased 
in Europe. On the other hand,  a point had been reached in economic integration 
from which there was no point of return for any Community member State. 
On the basis of an address by Mrs.  Elsner,  SPD Bundestag member and 
Chairman of the European Parliament's Ef'onomic and Financial Committee, 
the Social Democrats discussed the EEC Commission's draft programme for 
a medium-term economic policy.  The Congress adopted a detailed proposal 
for a resolution which can be regarded as the EEC Social Democrats'program-
me for a progressive economic policy,  short-term er·onomic policy and social 
and regional policy.  The delegates wel0omed the EEC Commission's draft 
. programme as the first step towards closer and more rational political co-
operation. 
A further resolution dealt with Europe as a political entity,  the Congress em-
phasizing that the advent of a European political authority,  in spite of the 
many difficulties and setbacks of recent years, was and remained the aim of 
the Europe of the Community.  The Social Democrats again confirmed that they 
were working actively and indefatigably for the creation of a federated Europe. 
In the resolution on the Community's political aims it was again pointed out 
that the European Communities had political as ,well as economic objectives. 
The economic union of the Six was an important step towards political union 
but must be carried further and completed.  It could not survive, however . 
unless the external policy  interests of members were reduced  to a common 
-11-denominator.  Economic union alone demanded a broader-based political ap-
proach in place of irregular progress in isolated spheres. This in turn called  ,. 
for further development of the Community's political structure. The Congress 
therefore demanded that the impending steps should form part of a broader 
approach to integration : 
a)  the setting up of a Council and of a Commission of the Communities; 
b)  the merger and further elaboration of the Treaties; 
c)  the strengthening of Community institutions,  and particularly of the 
European Parliament,  and general direct elections for the Euro-
pean Parliament; 
d)  matters of technological policy to come within the competence of 
the Community: 
e)  a uniform approach to the Community's external relations in keep-
ing with its internal development; 
f)  geographical enlargement of the Community in line with its political 
aims. 
(Sozialdemokratische Europa-Korrespondenz,  No.  5/1966,  Seventh Congress 
of the Social Democrat Parties of the European Communities, (Resolutions): 
Europa-Nachrichten der SPD-Fraktion aus Bundestag,  Europaischem ParJa-
ment und Europarat, No.  32,  22  November 1966;Frankfurter Allgemeine Zei-
tung,  18 November 1966· Industriekurier,  22  November 1966). 
7.  Sixteenth Ordinary Congress of the 'Europa-Union' of Germany in 
Baden-Baden 
On 22  November 1966 the 'Europa-Union' of Germany held its Sixteenth Con-
gress in Baden-Baden on 'Towards an integral Europe'. 
Mr.  Spaak,  former Belgian Prime Minister and Honorary President of the 
European Movement,  regarded it as a dangerous practice to pursue a policy 
towards the East through isolated initiatives.  He criticized the 'lone wolf' 
policy of the French President because a policy towards the East could onlybe 
successful if initiated by an integral Europe.  First of all the Atlantic crisis 
would have to be overcome.  Mr.  Spaak called upon the Germans to display 
greater efforts in their reunification policy.  Instead of always relying on 
Western powers, the Germans would show a greater sense of reality if they 
asked the allies to show an understanding of the need for German action. 
Mr.  Majonica, CDU  Bundestag member and President of the German Council 
of the European Movement,  thought that the European States and Germany 
should try to surmount the ideological line of demarcation on a bilateral basis. 
Moreover,  such a bilateral approach in Europe should be co-ordinated so as 
to guard against a parcelling out ot Europe. 
- 12  -Mr.  von der Groeben, German member of the EEC Commission,  discussed 
the concept of a common and largely liberalized trade policy towards the 
Eastern bloc for the European Economic Community.  This, he thought,  of-
fered the only chance for harmonization and liberalization in the East, in-
cluding the Soviet Zone,  and hope of a wider measure of self-determination 
for the citizens of East Germany.  A common trade policy towards Eastern 
bloc countries was essential for the following reasons : 
1.  It would impart greater cohesion to the European Economic Com-
munity; 
2.  As the Eastern bloc countries practised a state-trading system, the 
West could not trade with them without calling in the public author-
ities.  Within an organization as large as the Common Market such 
action could only be taken through Community institutions; 
3.  Such a common trade policy towards countries of the Eastern bloc 
was also necessary to ensure that the free movement of goods with-
in the Common Market was not disturbed by goods imported from 
the Eastern bloc under bilateral arrangements. 
Mr.  von der Groeben thought that trends towards liberalization should be 
made the basis of a Europeari policy on imports from State-trading countries. 
For this reason he called for (a)  the adoption by the Six of a common liberal-
ization list; (b)  the restriction of the quota system to a minimum of products 
for which the danger of one-sided west European dependence on imports could 
not be ruled out; (c)  the conversion of the national quotas of member States  . 
into Community quotas and the adoption of clauses designed to protect markets 
from disturbances caused by imports from the Eastern bloc. 
At the end of the session, the Congress adopted the following resolution : 
I. 
1.  Apart from the integration of Western Europe,  the policy of Euro-
pean unification aims at a comprehensive European federation em-
bracing all States reaching to the western frontier of Russia and 
enjoying relations on an equal footing with the United States of 
America and the Soviet Union. 
The Community of the Six is the core and starting-point of such a 
federation. 
A federated integral Europe means freedom and peace throughout 
Europe as a whole. 
2.  States with radically different social and political systems can exist 
side by side but cannot become federatively united.  To establish  a 
- 13  -federation between them they need not have identical constitutional 
provisions on property and the social order; they must, however, be 
legally constituted,  guarantee human rights and exercise authority 
on the basis of democratic elections,  involving free candidature and 
free voting.  Such a qualitative change of system cannot be brought 
about by enforced isolation,  by military pressur~ exerted by the 
free world,  or by a violent reversal, but only by a progressive 
structural transformation. 
3.  The division of Germany is to some extent the division of Europe. So 
long as the ideological and socio-political division of Europe per-
sists, the Germans in the 'DDR' will be unable to decide for them-
selves the future of their State.  But even if this obstacle is sur-
mounted,  reunification of Germany will only be possible,  in view 
of fears of German domination,  if Germany becomes a member of a 
federated Europe.  This would dispel such fears and at the same 
time ensures the existence and future of the German nation. 
II. 
A policy geared to this objective can be based on the following factors 
1.  The East-West conflict,  despite all the changes that have taken 
place since Stalin's death, remains a matter of power, politics and 
an ideological and social reality.  'Liberalization' has brought only 
gradual improvements to the peoples of the East and is no threat to 
the system in force.  Nevertheless polycentric trends have destroyed 
the monolithic character of the Eastern bloc and given it some mar-
gin for negotiating with the leaders in Moscow on  external and 
economic policy. 
2.  The nuclear stalemate, the danger of proliferation of atomic weap-
ons and the expansionist drive in China, have led the two major 
world powers to pursue a policy of easing tensions. This is reflected 
in Europe in a perpetuation of the status quo.  However,  if Europe 
takes its fate in its own hands,  it offers a chance of reaching beyond 
this status quo and of creating a pan-European order. 
III. 
The road to European unity is a long one. It leads from communication, 
through co-operation and integration, to federation.  This applies both to the 
unification of Western Europe and to pan-European union. 
1.  Apart from the forms so far assumed by communication and techni-
cal co-operation in a number of isolated sectors, the existing situu-
- 14-tion already provides scope for closer relations between Eastern 
and Western Europe at personal, cultural,  economic and political 
levels.  Every opportunity should be taken to pass from the stage of 
communication to that of co-operation.  Communication and co-
operation  should as far as possible be ensured by existing Euro-
pean organizations and institutions such as the Council of Europe, 
OECD and EEC.  More numerous and more closely co-ordinated con-
tacts bet'Y'een states and national organizations in the East andWest 
would also be of great value.  Such contacts should be co-ordinated 
especially within the context of the Franco-German treaty of friend-
ship. 
2.  The EEC is already of great economic importance for Eastern, 
Europe.  Its importance will grow still further once the EEC' s com-
mercial policy towards non-member countries,and particularly to-
wards those of the Eastern bloc.  is fully applied.  Such a policy must 
be geared to the pan-European concept already outlined,  and must 
back the efforts of Eastern bloc countries to achieve economic in-
dependence and establish co-operation among themselves.  Practical 
projects for the development of an pan-European infrastructure also 
come under this head. 
3.  Western Europe cannot take on these tasks of pan-European policy 
with any prospect of success unless it resolutely follows the road 
leading to Western European integration on which it set out with the 
creationofthe Eu.ropean Communities,  and unless it thwarts any at-
tempt to weaken the Communities and their political aims.  This 
also implies extending the Community of the Six to the other free 
countries of Western Europe.  Another essential condition for a suc-
cessful pan-European policy is the setting up as soon as possible of 
common institutions in the external and defence policy fields.  The 
notion that a dynamic policy towards the Eastern bloc countries 
could be better conducted by a disintegrating Western Europe con-
flicts with reality and could at the most lead to the balkanization of 
the whole of Europe.  On the other hand,  the unification of Western 
Europe holds out prospects of escaping from the choice between 
nationalism or satellite status,  dispels feelings of resignation  and 
awakens hope. 
IV. 
A common West European policy towards the Eastern bloc is impossible with-
out agreement on the aims underlying such a policy.  Moreover,  the Federal 
Republic must recast its policy in this sector - till now based on  national 
attitudes - along pan-European lines: 
- 15  -1.  The Federal Republic should lay greater emphasis than hitherto on 
the non-validity of the Munich agreement , taking into account the 
fundamental rights of Sudetenland Germans. 
2.  The German people must recognize that reconciliation with the 
peoples of  Eastern Europe,  and particularly the Poles, is more 
important than a revision of the Oder-Neisse  line,  and prepare it-
self for this sacrifice.  Acceptance in international law of this sacri-
fice by the Federal Republic will be imminent as soon as its policy 
of reconciliation awakens a favourable response in Poland and ques-
tions connected with Germans still living beyond the Oder-Neisse 
line have been settled. 
3.  The Federal Republic of Germany should renounce any form of pos-
session or sharing of nuclear weapons.  This would not mean doing 
without anti-nuclear protection or having no say in military plan-
ning and in the utilization of such weapons on German soil. 
4.  The Hallstein doctrine is an effective means of defending the Ger-
man peoplf  s  right to freedom and unity.  It remains, however,  an 
instrument and not an end in itself.  To enable Germany to resume 
diplomatic relations with the Eastern bloc countries and thus to co-
operate more in putting into effect a West European policy towards 
those countries, the Hallstein doctrine  should be applied at the 
opportune moment. 
5.  Recognition of the DDR as a State in its present form is ruled out. 
The policy outlined  here for Europe as a whole does not require it. 
Similarly,  all attempts to bring about a national rapprochement  in 
the form of a separate policy aimed at a confederation linking to-
gether the DDR and the Federal Republic of Germany should be re-
jected as leading in the false direction.  On the other hand, relations 
between the two parts of Germany calculated to give greater free-
dom and well-being to the people of the DDR should not be excluded. 
The same applies to the common policy of the Western powers to-
wards the Eastern bloc.  A legal solution to the problem of the terri-
tory of the DDR in a future European federation can only be sought 
in the light of actual developments.  The closer Europe as a whole 
approaches to a democratic federation,  the greater the scope the 
Federal Republic will have to settle this problem. 
v. 
The idea of a united,  integral Europe is today criticized as unrealistic owingto 
the existence of the Iron Curtain and of opposition existing between democratic 
and communist states.  This would be the case if the idea had been thought up 
merely as an expedient,  a project planned in advance stage by ~tage and to be 
- 16  -completed in the short term.  This is not the solution here under consideration 
An integral Europe is to be regarded as a long-term objective.  Decades may 
have to pass before it is achieved, an no one can guarantee ultimate success. 
Politics is the art of the possible, but it is also the art of rendering possible 
what is necessary. (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22  and 23 November 1966; 
Die Welt,  22,  23  and 24 November 196S; Neue ZUrcher Zeitung,  23 Novem-
ber 1966; Europaischer Erziehung, December 1966). 
8.  Europe's world responsibilities  - declaration by the European 
Movement 
The International Study Conference of the European Movement,  held at The 
Hague on 2,  3 and 4 December 1966, adopted unanimously (with one abstention) 
and issued the following declaration on Europe's world responsibilities 
'  The Conference of the European Movement : 
a)  points out that as from 1 July 1968 the European Economic Commu-
nity will have to speak with one voice and therefore size up its world 
responsibilities,  having regard to the important place it occupies at 
international level because of the size of its population, the diffusion 
and influence of its culture and the volume of its production and 
trade; 
b)  is of the opinion that a united Europe could not confine itself to es-
tablishing a rich and thriving area,  but would have to try to redress 
the imbalances - associated with a breakneck growth in population 
and ever-widening disparities between standards of living - which 
threaten the human race.  It would have to contribute to the general 
progress of mankind by stepping up trade and development aid,  and 
by working for the consolidation of peace. 
1.  Present state of Europe 
The Conference cannot hide its grave concern about the priority again being 
given in Europe to national interests which are in open conflict with the prepa-
ration of Community policies or hamper their implementation. 
It expresses its conviction, backed by fifteen years of experience, that Com-
munity methods have proved their worth,  and is glad to note that the institu-
tions of the Community have emerged successfully from the 1965 crisis with 
their creative drive and political aims intact. 
- 17 -2.  Enlargement of the Community 
The Conference welcomes the willingness expressed by Great Britain to enter 
the European Community.  It regards this initiative as a  major development of 
the European situation from which both Britain and the Six are destined to 
reap the benefits, particularly in the technological sector,  as recently sug-
gested by the British Prime Minister. 
The Conference is convinced that these negotiations display Britain's accept-
ance of the Treaty of Rome as a whole,  both in the letter and in the spirit. and 
hopes that they will be conducted as speedily as possible,  as also similar 
negotiations which would then be opened up. 
3.  Atlantic partnership 
As regards relations between Europe and the United States, partnership ap-
pears to the Conference to be the best means of solving monetary,  industrial, 
commercial and development problems for which the United States and Europe 
are jointly responsible.  To this end Community policy should be followed up in 
the Kennedy Round. 
4.  Relations with Eastern bloc countries 
The Conference warmly welcomes the current rapprochement, particularly in 
trade, co-operation and cultural exchanges, between We stern Europe and coun-
tries of the Eastern bloc.  In its view,  further progress in this direction re-
quires the European Community to act as one,  and the countries of the Eastern 
bloc to recognize the existing Communities. 
It considers that any effort to bring Eastern and Western Europe closer to-
gether is calculated to facilitate settlement of the problems of central Europe 
and particularly of the division of Germany. 
5.  Development aid 
The Conference is conscious of the dramatic developments taking place in the 
development countries and of the extent of the problems these are raising.  It 
advocates greater and more closely co-ordinated intervention by the industri-
- 18-ali  zed countries in the affairs of the developing countries, particularly by 
stepping up multilateral arrangements, of which association with the African 
and Malagasy States strikingly demonstrates the value. 
6.  Conclusion 
To be able to carry out these tasks Europe must be free to pursue an independ-
ent European policy.  commensurate with its responsibilities,  within the con-
text of Atlantic solidarity. 
This implies enlarging the European Community by admitting into it other 
countries, notably Great Britain,  so as to help give Europe its proper geo-
graphic scale, internal political balance,  and the instruments it needs to round 
off its monetary and economic structures. 
It also implies that Europe should invest itself with democratic political 
authority of its own to enable it,  at the appointed time,  to shoulder its respon-
sibilities a.td shape its own future. 
9.  Conference of the European Union of Christian Democrats held at 
Rome on 18 December 1966 
The  c:hairmen and political secretaries of the Christian Democratic Parties of 
the European Community countries,  met at Rome to study problems facing the 
Community.  The proceedings were presided over by Mr.  Mariano Rumor as 
President of the European Union of Christian Democrats.  At the close of the 
proceedings the following statement was issued : 
'The chairmen and secretaries general of the Christian Democrat Parties of 
the EEC countries,  meeting at Rome on  18 December 1966 under the chair-
manship of Mr.  Rumor,  and having heard the report by Mr.  Illerhaus, chair-
man of the Christian Democrat Group of the European Parliament and member 
of the Bundestag,  on the state of the European Community.  confirm that the 
aim of the Christian Democrats is today,  more than ever before,  a politically 
united Europe,  modern,  free.  democratic and integrated, free from nation-
alism in all its forms,  whether traditional or resurgent. 
The Conference considers it ought to make known the point of view of the 
Christian Democrat Parties both regarding institutional bodies and regarding 
the progress of Community policy and the Community's relations with the rest 
of the world. 
- 19-At institutional level, the Conference maintains that th~ establishment of a 
single executive is an important step in the Community's existence and should 
therefore be taken as promptly as possible. At the same time it feels that the 
merger should not encroach in any way on the authority and the responsibili-
ties of the present executive  organs. 
The importance of the decisions of the European Executives,  and the exten-
sion of their authority,  call for greater parliamentary supervision. 
The Conference takes note of the notable progress made by Community institu-
tions in a number of sectors : 
a)  abolition of customs frontiers as from 1 July 1968; 
b)  agreements on the common agricultural policy: 
c)  introduction of a medium-term economic policy covering the period 
1966-1970. 
The Conference approves the EEC Commission's approach to the Kennedy 
Round negotiations,  and hopes these will be promptly and successfully con-
cluded. 
The Conference considers it a matter of urgency to pursue the followingobjec-
tives : 
a)  harmonization of legal provisions, particularly in the fiscal sector; 
b)  introduction of a common commercial policy towards non-member 
countries, including those of the Eastern bloc; 
c)  more active pursuit of a common policy for the economic develop-
ment of less-favoured European areas; 
d)  introduction of a common social policy,  and particularly overhaul of 
the European Social Fund. 
The Conference underlines the dangers inherent in the technological gap sepa-
rating the Six from the great powers. It sees bright prospects for the Six in 
technological co-operation and scientific research conducted on Community 
lines. 
The Conference welcomes the turn taken by the United Kingdom's  policy to-
wards the EEC,  a clear sign of the pull exerted by the ideal and institutional 
reality of the Community. 
The Conference welcomes the development of a policy on association and col-
laboration in the spirit of the Treaties. 
- 20-It considers that only a Europe built on Community lines can help to meet the 
needs and the appeals of the developing countries,  and stresses its interest in 
a common policy towards Latin America. 
The Conference regards such a Europe as the only means of ensuring partici-
pation by the entire free world,  on a basis of equality,  in the task of guaran-
teeing its security and prosperity. 
The chairmen and secretaries general  of the Christian Democrat Parties of 
the EEC  countries invite the Community governments  to display  resolute 
political will with a view to overcoming present difficulties and achieving the 
aims laid down in the Treaty with an eye to ultimate political union. (Il Popolo, 
19 December 1966). 
10.  Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani' s  visit to the Federal Republic of 
Germany 
The Bonn visit of Italian Foreign Minister Fanfani on 20 December 1966 awoke 
a favourable response in Germany',  and the communique on the talks between 
him and the Federal Chancellor  spoke of a cordial atmosphere.  The Italian 
Foreign Minister's remarks on the unification of Europe  aroused particular 
interest  .i.n German circles.  The Federal  Government assured the  Italian 
statesman of its interest in further bilateral collaboration with Italy, particu-
larly in the technological field. 
Agreement was reached on three points in which the Italian Government is par-
ticularly interested :  (i)  the easing of tension and an East-West dialogue on 
the reduction of armaments as the necessary prelude to a rapprochement of 
the two halves of Europe;  (ii)  co-operation between the USA  and the European 
nations with a view to closing the technological gap; and  (iii)  exploratory 
talks aimed at relaunching the drive for European integration. 
On the Italian side,  the  suggestion  emanating from  French sources  that 
Mr.  Fanfani intended to act as an intermediary was described as an exagger-
ation. All that he had done  was to convey to  Federal Chancellor  Kiesinger 
General de Gaulle's  wish for a  resumption of the negotiations on European 
political union which had been interrupted four years earlier following the 
failure of the Fouchet Committee.  Although  Bonn showed some reserve on the 
subject, Italian observers  stated that  these negotiations  should not be con-
ducted merely at one or two levels, but at all levels and with all the countries 
concerned,  as well as with the participation or association of a British repre-
sentative.  (Die Welt,  23  December 1966; Frankfurter Allgemeine  Zeitung, 
21 December 1966). 
- 21-II.  ECONOMIC  POLICY  AND  ECONOMIC  SECTORS 
1.  The UNICE and European integration 
On 22  November,  'l'Union des Industries de la Communaut~  Europ~enne' (The 
Union of the Industries in the European Community) published "l'lndustrie 
Europeenneface al'intc§gration economique et sociale' (European industry and 
economic and social integration) on the problems of bringing the Community. 
into being.  This is non-political ; it does, however,  reaffirm a basic UNICE 
attitude :that the creation of the Common Market makes it indispensable 
a)  to bring about economic union, 
b)  to co-ordinate cyclical policies 
c)  to introduce common policies in many sectors and 
d)  to set Community machinery and policy instruments in motion. 
The UNICE calls for  'a coherent industrial policy'  ; it makes it clear that it 
is in the interest of 'European industry for European integration to come 
about in all those areas covered by the Treaties of Paris and Rome. ' 
With regard to trade between the member States, the publication argues that 
the abolition of customs duties must go hand in hand with progress towards a 
genuine customs union ; it refers specifically to the removal of technical and 
administrative obstacles to trade.  The UNICE realizes that these obstacles 
will have to be abolished in gradual stages; as a first step it calls for arrange-
ments for consultations between the Six whenever one of them makes changes 
or introduces new provisions.  Stress is also laid on the introduction of indus-
trial standards and on the  'urgency'  of re-adjusting state trading monopolies. 
Referring to relations with third countries, the UNICE deplored  'the in-
creasing drawbacks resulting from the disparity between the trade policies of 
the member States, particularly with regard to the Eastern Bloc and the coun-
tries whose price levels are low' ; it called for the preparation,  in good time, 
of the technical instruments necessary for the common trade policy ; it asked 
that during the transition period a more pronounced co-ordination of national 
policies should be initiated ; it asked that the Six should adopt a  'Community 
attitude '  on the Kennedy Round ; it asked that a solution should be found to the 
problems of tariff quotas (which called in question the industry's supplies of 
raw materials and semi-finished products and,  hence, their competitive posi-
tion at the world level) and the harmonization of customs law.  For the pur-
poses of enlarging the EEC, the UNICE considered that the Community must 
favourably envisage negotiations with any European country ready to accept 
- 23  -the Treaty in full.  The possibility of association could be accepted·- unless 
there were over-riding political reasons to the contrary - only as a prelude to 
accession. 
With regard to economic policy, the UNIC E reaffirmed the need for a liberal 
economic system in the Community based on guarantees for private property 
and the freedom of the markets; it thought it desirable that the member States 
should already begin co-ordinating their economic policies.  It advocated 
strengthening the solidarity of the Six in the sphere of international monetary 
relations and a concerted short-term economic policy at the Community level. 
The Community's recommendations with regard to short-term economic pol-
icy had to be  'more and more scrupulously followed by the member States and 
by the social partners.'  The UNICE was also in favour of the EEC's medium-
term economic policy programme which it regarded as a major adjunct to 
achieving a  continuous and balanced economic expansion'.  The UNICE partic-
ularly emphasized the need to give priority to the accumulation of capital in-
tended for productive investment through a whole range of fiscal and economic 
measures. 
With regard to social policy, the UNICE drew attention to the int~r-relation­
ship between social policy and economic development ; it repeated its asser-
tion that the Treaty  'limited the Commission's scope in the social sphere to 
objectives considered indispensable to the realization of the economic union '. 
The UNICE agreed, however,  that in future  'neither governments nor social 
partners will be able,  any longer, to base social legislation and economic pol-
icy on exclusively national considerations ; they will also have to gear them 
to the Community interest'.  The task of the Commission consisted primarily 
in making comparative and analytical studies. It had to ensure that the social 
policy aims, which member States feel able to achieve,  are co-ordinated  in-
stead of indicating objectives incompatible either with political options or the 
economic possibilities of the member States, 
With regard to the structure of industry, the UNIC E  called for 
a) the creation of production units  'able to win their way and make their 
mark on the world markets ' , 
b)  co-operation between enterprises, 
c)  the harmonization of company law and 
d)  the creation of a  European-type enterprise. 
With regard to fiscal harmonization, the UNICE was in favour of the added 
value tax, of abolishing double taxation and of removing fiscal obstacles to the 
merger.  The UNICE also repeated its support for creating a  European patent. 
With reference to the European capital market, the UNICE  argued that once 
the watertight compartments around markets were broken down, better use 
could be made of the financial resources available for investments and supply 
would increase.  Industry asked that it should not be placed at a disadvantage 
- 24-as compared with the public sector with regard to access to the capital mar-
ket ; it stressed the need for the stability of rates of exchange within the 
Community. 
With reference to scientific and technical research policy, the UNICE pointed 
out that European industry was concerned by the technological gap between the 
Community and the United States, a gap which was growing all the time.  The 
UNICE  felt that  'action must be taken at the Community lev~l'  both in fiscal 
matters and in regard to documentation ; it advocated the adoption of the 
American system, whereby research contracts are awarded to industry,  a 
reasonable competition policy and exchanges of research workers. 
With reference to the policy for regions and sectors, the UNICE  considered 
that the regional policies of the member_ States had to be co-ordinated at the 
European level and common rules laid down with regard to interventions.  In-
dustry was, in general, opposed to any specific policy in favour of certain 
branches, except in the case of quite special situations.  Even studies into in-
dividual sectors should be conducted with great prudence and not be published 
before the sectors concerned had been consulted. 
With regard to the common tranport policy the UNIC E confirmed its support 
for a liberal policy, both as regards access to the occupation and to the liber-
alization of markets and price policy. (Agence Europe, 22 November 1966) 
2.  For a  European scientific and technical research policy 
Many voices are being raised in the Community calling for Europe to bridge 
the scientific and technical research gap.  Mr.  Petrilli, for example, has sug-
gested a  European research and occupational training plan; Mr. E. Hirsch has 
stated his views on Mr.  Wilson's proposal to create a European technological 
Community ; and in the French National Assembly many members have called 
for the implementation of a  European scientific and technical research policy. 
On 15  November, at the Italian Agricultural Institute in Paris, Mr.  Petrilli, 
President of the IRI (Industrial Redevelopment Institute) spoke of Europe's 
chances of catching up with the United States in the research which fashioned 
further industrialization. 
'It is sufficient, he said, to look briefly at the experience gained so far in the 
European Communities as regards co-ordinating the national effort in scien-
tific and technological research to show clearly the political responsibilities 
that fall to the European leadership as a whole.  We  are thinking,  above all, of 
Euratom which was originally conceived as the instrument of a  common re-
search policy ..... 
- 25  -The concern about energy supplies occasioned by the Suez crisis was dissi-
pated at the same time as any hope of setting up a genuine common energy 
policy ; this was enough to induce the member States to return to the restric-
tive concept of national interest, with the result that the Treaty became more 
and more ineffective. ' 
Professor Petrilli considered that the experience of the Common Market had 
hardly been more encouraging than that of the two specialized Communities : 
'It has been rightly said, that the lack of any provisions on a common scien-
tific and technological research policy in the Treaty of Rome is sufficient in 
itself to prove how much things have changed in less than ten years.  This and 
the difficulties that have beset attempts to implement a  common occupational 
training policy - for which there are still no appropriate intervention instru-
ments  ..:.  proves,  in fact,  that it  has not yet been realized how urgent it is for 
a joint effort to be made in these key sectors.' 
What was the remedy to this state of affairs. 'In any event, replied Professor 
Petrilli, it would be wrong to think in terms of sector by sector interventions; 
scientific and technological research play an essential part in economic expan-
sion to-day and it would not be possible to conceive of a programme in this 
sphere which took no  account of the general direction of economic develop-
ment.  In our opinion this policy should, on the contrary, be the core of a me-
dium  -term economic plan for Europe because the choices made in this sphere 
are the origin of all other options, beginning with those related to teaching and 
occupational training and those related to the balanced development of infra-
structures.' 
One thing is,  in any event,  certain, writes the editor of  'Le Monde'  : every-
where in Europe the question is beginning to be asked.  Some time ago  Mr. 
H.  Neuman of la Soci~t~ nationale d'investissements (the National Investment 
Company) of Belgium was also asking how could large European enterprises 
be created -the large European enterprises that would,  in the opinion of Mr. 
Petrilli, be the privileged instruments of the  'new industrialization' . 
' In view particularly of the shortage of capital in relation to the needs,  one 
might,  he said, think of creating a  European development (or investment) 
company.  Working in conjunction with the European Bank,  such a company 
could contribute to the supply of association capital to our industries, without 
claiming control. If capital could be subscribed both by the States and by pri-
vate and public enterprises, it could also become an active centre for com-
paring viewpoints and for the study of projects of European interest.' 
For  his part Mr.  Etienne Hirsch, former President of the Euratom Commis-
sion,  commented in  'Le Monde'  on the proposal made by Mr.  H.  Wilson, 
British Prime Minister, on the creation of a  European technological Commu-
nity.  Mr.  Hirsch observed that no one today disputed the fact that the West 
European countries would be unable to maintain or rather to regain an honour-
able place in the race for technical progress if they worked in isolation.  The 
- 26-lack of financial resources and especially the lack of qualified men made this 
impossible.  Specialization was no solution, with the interdependence of 
sciences and techniques growing daily. 
He considered that an attempt should be made to draw the conclusions from 
the experiments in progress before trying to determine the conditions that had 
to be met so as to give the enterprise the maximum chance of success. 
Firstly there was a law which applied to all financial operations involving 
contributions by several Governments : 'Each Government wishes to get back, 
in the form ·Of contracts awarded or expenditure made in its country, the 
share that it has paid into the joint fund.  It is because of this law that Euratom 
found itself obliged to scatter research work between more centres than effi-
~  ciency really allowed,  This is also why it was obliged to award contracts to 
firms in country  'B'  less qualified that firms in country  'A'.  The European 
rocket comprises three stages, one of which is entrusted to each of the three 
main participating countries, whereas,  rationally, the work should have been 
split up quite differently.  The European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee 
Fund was the subject of fierce disputes when, because of wheat,  France got 
back much more than she paid in ; the difficulties were only overcome when 
products affecting other countries were brought in,  including in the last in-
stance, olive oil for Italy •.... This custom requires an institution to  em-
brace a sufficiently wide and varied sphere for it to be possible fairly to dis-
tribute establishments, contracts and orders between the various participa-
ting countries in terms of their capacities or their real vocations.  Narrowly 
specialized institutions are unable to work like this and the result is a disper-
sion instead of a concentration of efforts.  This is why the  'Europe ala carte' 
advocated by my friend,  Louis Armand,  and which would consist of drawing 
up  a series of agreements of specialized bodies,  seems to me to be the oppo-
site of what is required, ' 
Secondly,  Mr.  Hirsch stressed that it was essential to dovetail pure research 
and technological research.  ' To conclude,  technology coupled with science 
cannot develop on its own.  It is closely dependent on the training of research 
workers and technicians of all kinds and on the possibilities of industrial co-
operation. Its basic policy,  its priority aims and the resources at its disposal 
are related to the requirements and the possibilities of the economy as a 
whole,  and are one of the constituent parts of a  European economic plan.  We 
must, at all costs, avoid making technological research into a separate entity 
which has no organic links with the other European institutions. 
The disadvantages of the co-existence of three distinct European Communities 
have already been recognized and whatever accidents may befall on the way we 
are moving towards the merger of the Executives and then towards that of the 
Communities. 
Let us therefore avoid creating a fourth Community.  It would be the more un-
fortunate because in all probability Euratom is to become one of the branches 
- 27-of a European technological organization which must itself have its place and a 
place in the forefront in the structure of the European Community.' 
In the debate in the ·French National Assembly on 30  November, when the sub-
ject under discussion was setting up research bodies,  Mr. A.  Peyrefitte, 
Minister delegate responsible for scientific research and nuclear and space 
questions, stated that  'there is no country as desirous as France of develop-
ing European scientific and technical co-operation.  In March of last year, 
France took the initiative with a view to promoting and co-ordinating the sci-
entific an~ technical research of the Six countries.of the Common Market. 
What is still needed, the Minister stressed, is for our partners to feel as 
strongly as we do the need to co-operate.  There is evidence that this is being 
realized.' 
Mr.  D.  Catroux (UNR),  Chairman of the Committee for Research and Cultural 
Affairs of the European Parliamentary Assembiy, stressed that multilateral 
agreements often provoked less criticism than bilateral agreements.  'Thus, 
in Euratom, when difficulties have appeared, whether in connexion with the 
second financing plan or the third financing plan, a majority view has emerged 
and agreements have followed. '  The speaker then drew the attention of the 
Assembly to Euratom's present situation. 
' In the administration of this Community, it is going to be necessary for us to 
resort to the system of provisional twelfths because we have been unable to 
agree with our partners on a whole range of projects.  This will,  of course, 
inevitably mean delays in the completion of projects and agreements that we 
have signed with certain scientists for special projects are liable to be com-
promised. 
The French Government, whose European spirit is so often wrongly doubted, 
was therefore right in proposing a research co-operation agreement to our 
Common Market partners.  On the Council of Ministers of the Common Market 
France must remain the leader it has always been in the past,  and it must en-
sure that Euratom's mission and its future,  after the merger of the Execu-
tives, are made quite clear. It would be a disaster if such centres as Ispra 
were to have their future and their work to date called into question or for the 
Orgel Project to be called into question notwithstanding its promising start or 
that research of every type,  especially medical and biological research, 
which is a matter of national and Community concern, should be interrupted. 
I am convinced that the medium-term programme, which the EEC  study com-
mittee has submitted to the attention of the Governments, could be a basis for 
satisfactory studies with regard to. the general direction of the Common Mar-
ket • It  would enable us,  at some future date,  if not to compete with the USA 
and the USSR,  at least to take part in a suitable manner in the great adventure 
of our century by harnessing efficient scientific research to safeguard the devel-
opment of our industry and future of our economy. ' 
- 28  -Mr.  F.  Mitterand (Rassemblement d~mocratique), discussing the relationship 
between Europe and research, stressed that the crisis in the European organ-
izations had arisen,  in particular, over the problem of nuplear research.  He 
added :  'I cannot see how the Community techniques and the Community econ-
omy can be sound if the Community policy is not sound also.  Indeed if we  -
check  our thrust towards the political Europe, it will be hard to expect our 
European partners to demonstrate any great willingness to participate in the 
realization of the various aspects of technical,  scientific and economic 
Europe.' 
Mr.  De Lipkowski (UNR)  considered that the economic and,  hence, the politi-
cal future of Europe was dependent on the development of research.  Yet 
Europe's leeway in this sphere had reached dramatic proportions and it was 
tending to get worse.  The speaker observed that the Treaty of Rome made no 
allusion to a common scientific policy which was at present possible only for 
coal and steel and for the nuclear sector.  Mr.  De  Lipkowski stressed how 
slowly the working party on scientific and technical research set up by the 
EEC Commission was progressing ; he drew attention to Germany's diffidence 
and recalled the French Note of March 1965,  addressed to the EEC Council of 
Ministers, on the elaboration of a common scientific and technical research 
policy.  Mr.  De  Lipkowski consideredthat apolitical choice was involved: did • 
the Six wish to implement a concerted research policy in Europe in order to 
face the U~ited States together or not. Europe's efforts, however great, were 
liable never to counter-balance those made by the United States.  Consequently 
if the European economies were to have key industries in the world class and 
if they were to go in for advanced technology without coming under American 
tutelage,  an attempt had to be made to double Europe's  efforts through agree-
ments with the Americans,  so that these efforts were not in vain.  An opportu-
nity presented itself for conducting such negotiations with the Americans and 
Europe must seize it ; this was the Kennedy Round where Europe had the 
means of exchange. It would be well to raise the whole question of research 
on the Kennedy Round and to couple customs dismantlement measures with so-
lutions that might later be found for trade or the distribution of techniques. 
By coupling customs dismantlement with research, we should increase our 
chances of seeing the United States accept a more constructive attitude.  The 
problem of licences should be raised to the level of Kennedy Round discussions. 
Europe should ask that as duties on finished products are cut, it should,  at 
least in certain sectors, have the opportunity to use key American techniques 
at competitive prices for these duty reductions will increase the USA's export-
ing opportunities in Europe. 
The purch~se of a licence without trade was already a delicate operation ; the 
reduction in protection rates would increase these difficulties.  At the same 
time it would be desirable for Europe to make an effort to try to scale new 
heights - as compared with the Americans - in certain key industries where 
Europe appears to be in strong position.  (Le Monde,  17  NoveJI\ber,  25  No-
vember 1966.  J. o.  AN  Debats 1 December 1965) 
- 29-3.  Italian industrialists and the Kennedy Round 
On 21 October Dr.  Angelo Costa, President of the General Confederation of 
Italian Industry, delivered an address on the Kennedy Round in the course of 
the first seasonal meeting of the Ameri9an Chamber of Commerce in Italy 
held at Milan. 
He began by recalling how,  after the economic and moral devastation wreaked 
by the war, Europe had been able to rise again only thanks to American aid. 
Although it might be questioned whether the funds provided had always been 
judiciously spent, there was no doubt that the advantages reaped went far be-
yond the aid granted which had made it possible to use labour and plant that 
would otherwise have stood idle. 
The Kennedy Round should be regarded as a continuation of the United States' 
policy of aid to Europe and to all countries. It marked the transition from di-
rect aid to creating conditions that would enable all countries to move forward 
under their own steam.  The reciprocal 50 per cent reduction agreed in cus-
toms tariffs was an empirical concept, but in certain situations either empiri-
cal decisions were taken or no progress was made at all.  The 50 per centre-
duction was indeed the only means by which any progress could be made, 
Two main difficulties had to be dealt with.  First and foremost, certain sec-
tors felt themselves directly threatened by the possible 50 per cent customs 
tariff reduction and had therefore asked to be excluded from the negotiations. 
Now,  unless such exclusion were allowed only exceptionally and in the barest 
minimum of cases, the general effect would be to lose sight of the general 
welfare in an attempt to cushion the damage suffered by individual sectors. 
Secondly,  if a  50 per cent reduction were applied indifferently to prohibitive 
US  tariffs and to Community tariffs that were barely protectionist, the net re-
sult would be to leave a prohibitive tariff in force in the United States and to 
abolish  any form of protection in Europe. 
The Kennedy Round involved both industrial and agricultural problems.  As 
regards the latter, the EEC would have to ease the tariff burden to assist de-
veloping countries that were suppliers to the Community.  In the industrial 
sector tariff policy was more complex owing to the increasing burden of ad-
vance costs (investments) as compared to production costs.  A distinction 
should also be made between average costs and additional costs.  Obviously an 
industry that could call on a large internal market, and could therefore en-
gage in large-scale production - for instance, the chemical industry - would 
be able to step up output still further and export at additional cost - a cost re-
lated not to the quantity obtained at average unit cost but to any unit produced 
over and above this at rapidly decreasing costs. 
Without such a policy aimed at facilitating trade and widening the scope for 
work and exports, the preservation of peace would be an arduous task. 
- 30-'Everybody,'  conclude~  Dr.  Costa,  'talks about peace ; but peace can only 
come about when we esrabl!sh it within our families and between individual na-
tions by reconciling the social classes.  Not all who advocate peace want it in 
the social sphere in individual countries.'  (II Sole-24 Ore, 22 October 1966) 
4.  Committee of professional Agricultural Organizations (COPA)  and 
the common agricultural policy 
The Presidents and Mahagers of the Professional Agricultural Organizations 
and institutions of the Six met at an extraordinary general assembly of COPA 
(Committee of Professional Agricultural Organizations of the EEC) at 
Amsterdam on 1 December 1966 under the chairmanship of Mr.  Knottnerus. 
At the close of the proceedings the meeting approved a resolution stating that 
the economic integration of the Six called for corresponding progress in the 
political sector.  The meeting was fully alive to the difficulties encountered by 
farmers following  the amendments  curtailing the transitional period.  It was 
therefore essential to tighten the bonds existing between the Community's 
agricultural organizations and to make better use without delay of all the pro-
fessional means available with a view to endowing agriculture with the weight 
it needed under new market conditions.  A report should be drawn up each 
year on the economic and social situation of farmers and of agriculture.  The 
Council should fix the common prices  annually on the basis of that report 
which should be submitted by the Committee,  The report should be available 
for the first time in 1967 and the professional organizations should be given 
an opportunity to comment both on the report and on the anticipated prices. 
As regards the negotiations in GATT, these should on no  account affect the 
agricultural prices to be fixed annually by the Community.  The common 
prices fixed in 1964 and 1966, which took no account of the criteria laid down 
in Article 40 of the Treaty and had been fixed in the  light of data since super-
seded, would only come  into effect between July 1967 and July 1968.  They 
should therefore be reviewed in the  light of trends in the cost of productive 
factors. 
As regards international trade, a solution could not be found at commercial 
and tariff level.  To obtain lasting results, the international markets would 
have to be overhauled mainly by harmonizing national agricultural policy 
systems at international level.  -
The resolution recognized the difficult problems that would be raised by en-
larging the Community with a view to abolishing the harmful economic division 
of Europe.  As far as agriculture was concerned,  such an enlargement should 
be subject to a number of conditions : 
- 31-a)  an assurance that the aims of the Treaty relating to raising the living 
standards of agricultural workers would never be called int? question ; 
b)  an opportunity for the countries concerned to harmonize their agricul-
tural policies with that of the EEC in the course of a reasonable transi-
tion period ; 
c)  the establishment of an overall balance among the various economic ac-
tivities with a view to promoting smooth progress of the economy and of 
the various areas of the Community. 
The resolution pointed out that if the Community entered into association 
agreements or bilateral agreements in a haphazard  way, this could disturb both 
agricultural policy as a whole and the equilibrium between the various agri-
cultural interests in the Community. 
On social policy the aim should be to strive for a balanced structure of the ru-
ral population.  For this purpose the resolution recommended : 
a)  setting up an adequate number of occupational guidance and retraining 
centres in rural areas ; 
b) prompt approval by the Council of draft Regulations Nos.  503  and 504 and 
of the credits needed to put them into effect (1)  ; 
c)  co-ordination of measures in the EEC aimed at helping young farmers to 
take over the running of farms,  and of provisions enabling of eligible 
age, or those working on farms incapable of showing an adequate return, 
either to secure a fai.r pension tied to the official price index (moving 
scale) or to switch to other activities ; 
d)  making available non-agricultural occupations in given areas so as to en-
sure a balanced pattern of the population and of regional life. 
The resolution closed by advocating the introduction of a new system of en-
suring the social protection of agricultural workers by means of specialized 
mutual associations or co-operatives or of bodies in which farming represent-
atives can play an adequate part.  Such a system should not however be such 
as tQ  increase the social charges already difficult to cover from low agricul-
tural incomes. 
(1)  Community contributions towards the occupational retraining of p6rsons 
who desire to switch over to another occupation while remaining in  the 
agricultural sector (5 03). 
Contributions for facilitating the specialist training information service 
advisers to agricultural workers (504). 
- 32-Ill.  EXTERNAL  RELATIONS 
1.  The Spanish Minister for the Development Plan and the integration of 
Spain in the Common Market 
Mr. Lopez Rodo, Minister  for the Development Plan, interviewed by  'Le Monde' 
dealt at length with Spain's integration in the Common Market.  In answer to a 
first question,  Mr.  Lopez Rodo,  made clear that the reply given to Spain's 
request would have a bearing on the preparation of the second development 
plan to come into force in 1968 :  'Spain's developmenfwill continue even if no 
agreement with the Common Market is signed, but its emphasis and nature 
will differ according to the answer given.  The more closely Spain is involved 
in the European economy, the greater will be the advantages gained from spe-
cialization and mass production and the greater, consequently, will her 
growth rate be. The development of the different sectors will also vary ac-
cording to the scale of the links between Spain and the Common Market :the 
closer .these are, the greater will be the importance assumed by the exporting 
sectors.' 
'Attention must be drawn however to the uncertainty that the delay on the part 
of the EEC,  in deciding on Spain's request, has cast on the industrial pros-
pects of our country.  It has also to be remembered that the Spanish economy's 
basic emphasis ought logically to lead to its integration within the economy of 
the Community (over a  5 year period Spain's exports to the Six have quintu-
pled from $300m.  in 1959 to 1, 500m.  in 1965). If this integration is not to be 
anticipated, it will become very difficult,  in the long run, to pursue a policy 
which has recently been characterized by a growing deficit of our balance of 
trade and balance of payments.' 
With regard to the form that links between  Spain and the Common Market  should 
take,  the Minister said :  'The report drawn up by the Common Market Com-
mission on the talks with Spain recognized that the desired objective, both for 
my country and the EEC, would be a phased integration.  The report proposed 
that the Council of Mini~ters of the Community should authorize studies and 
negotiations on these possibilities with Spain.  There are two possible solu-
tions in which these negotiations could culminate and - I should like to empha-
size this point - both these solutions would lead to the same end : integration. 
The Spanish Government has stated on several occasions that the idea of a 
trade treaty with the Common Market does not seem adequate. It wishes to 
obtain either partial or complete integration.  We  have before us all the time 
we need so that our economy, like that of the EEC,  can make the necessary 
adjustments.  I believe that here the interests of Spain and those of the  Com-
mon Market rlovetail perfectly '. 
- 33-Mr.  Lopez Rodo then emphasized that  'the majority among Spanish manage-
ment is in agreement with the Government.  They seek the fullest possible in-
tegration with Europe and want this to come about gradually and within appro-
priate time-limits.  They do not wish to remain on the outskirts of Europe ; 
there are not only economic reasons for this but also historic and cultural 
reasons.  They will need, of course, to  ... bring their industries into line with 
the new circumstances brought about by integration : keener competition and 
larger markets. ' 
Lastly,  in answer to the question whether the. 'organic democracy' of the 
Spanish State was an obstacle to Spain's integration with Europe,  Mr.  Lopez 
Rodo said : "These differences should not constitute an obstacle.  The organic 
law of the State brings us into line with Europe.  It is difficult to say whether 
the differences between the new constitutional law adopted by the referendum 
of 14  December and the French constitution is greater or smaller than the 
difference between the latter and the Italian constitution.  There co-exist, 
within the Common Market, monarchist and republican constitutions, the 
French unitary constitution,  and the German Federal constitution, the French 
presidentialism and the German parliamentarianism ; all this proves that to-
day we need to be realistic, each country trying to find its own formula and 
this is why economic integration is going forward between the countries whose 
political systems differ.'  (Le Monde,  27 December 1966) 
2.  Ger"l!lany and Spain's association with the Common Market 
In a letter to Professor Hallstein, President of the EEC Commission,  the for-
mer Federal Foreign Minister,  Mr.  Schroder, complained of the delay in 
dealing with the Spanish application for association with the Economic Com-
munity.  As confirmed by the Federal Foreign Ministry on 23  November,  Mr. 
Schroder had dispatched his letter in the middle of the month.  In this he had 
requested Professor Hallstein to submit the written report on the EEC Com-
mission's negotiations with the Spanish Government to the Council of Minis-
ters of the Economic Community. 
On 5 December Mr.  Castiella, Spanish Foreign Minister,  gave a dinner in 
honour of State-Secretary Lahr of the Federal Foreign Ministry.  This was 
attended by high officials of the Spanish Foreign Minjstry, by Mr. Lopez-Bravo, 
Minister for Industry,  and by other representatives of industry in Spain. 
In a  subsequent interview given to German press correspondents,  Mr.  Lahr 
pointed out that the position taken up by German external policy towards an 
agreement between Spain and the EEC -backed both by the Federal Govern-
ment and by France - would not change even after the reshuffle in the Federal 
Foreign Ministry in Bonn,  He added that Mr.  Brand,  Federal Foreign  Minis-
- 34 -ter, had told him shortly before his departure for Madrid that he intended to 
follow on with the approach so far adopted in Bonn in favour of an agreement 
between the Council of Ministers in Brussels and the Madrid Government. 
Mr,  Lahr felt that Spain's association with the Common Market was desirable 
if only because it would stimulate political and economic progress in that 
country which would thus become an even more important trade partner.  He 
believed the Benelux countries were now showing signs of being less reluctant 
to admit Spain into the Common Market.  Like Bonn,  Paris was adopting a 
positive attitude to the whole question.  (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
7 December 1966) 
- 35-Part  II 
PARLIAMENTARY  ACTIVITY 
I.  EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
a)  Work of the Committees in December 1966 
Political Committee (1)-
Meeting of 5 December in Brussels :  Discussion preliminary to the drafting 
of the report by Mr.  Dehousse and problems concerning the policy of the 
Communities vis-a-vis third countries and international organizations. 
Review of the Committee's working programme : 
a)  with reference to the mandate given to the Political Committee under 
the Resolution of 18  October 1966 (appended to the General Report of 
the Ninth General Report on the activities ol Euratom) Mr.  Schuijt 
was appointed Rapporteur; 
b)  Mr.  Edoardo Martino was asked to draft a note (to be referred tothe 
Commission) for the attention of the Bureau of the Parliament on the 
latter's intervention in the procedure laid down in the EEC Treaty 
for the conclusion of international agreements with third countries, 
unions of State or international organizations; 
c)  Mr. van der Goes van Naters was asked to draft a fresh report on 
problems connected with organizing co-operation between the Euro-
pean Parliament and the Parliament of third countries with which 
the Communities have concluded international agreements. 
Joint meeting with the External Trade Committee on 6 December in Brussels: 
Discussion on the negotiations in progress between the Community and 
a)  Spain,  b)  Israel,  c)  tlie  Magreb countries  : Mr.  Edoardo Martino and 
Mr.  Pedini took the chair and Mr.  Rey was present. 
- 37-External Trade Committee (2) 
Meeting of 6 December in Brussels :  Examination of the state of the world 
steel market and the work of the High Authority in this sector (Rapporteur : 
Mr.  Bech); Mr.  Raynaud,  a member of the High Authority,  was present. 
Discussion with a view to drawing up the Opinion to be referred to the Politi-
cal Committee on relations between the Community and third countries and in-
ternational organizations.  (Rapporteur : Mr.  Rossi) 
Review of the state of progress with the Kennedy Round. 
Discussion preliminary to the drafting of a  report on the approximation of 
laws on export drawbacks (Rapporteur : Mr.  Vredeling). 
Examination of the amended EE C Commission proposal to the Council and re-
gulation on the phased introduction of a management procedure of import quo-
tas (Rapporteur : Mr.  Vredeling). 
Agricultural Committee (3) 
Meeting of 7 December at Brussels :  First exchange of views on problems 
connected with the conclusion of a world agreement on sugar. 
Initial discussion on amendments to the proposal for a  Council regulation 
amending Regulation No.  26. 
Oral report by Mr.  Richarts and discussion on an EEC proposal for a regula-
tion amendingRegulationNo.  14/64/EEC as regards determining the import 
price of,  and calculating the levy on, products in the beef and veal sector. 
Oral report by Mr.  Esteve and discussion on proposals submitted to the Coun-
cil by the EEC Commission on directives  concerning measures  ac:ainst 
(i)  potato wart; (ii) the root celworm. 
Social Committee (4) 
Meeting of 6 December in Brussels :  Resumption of study of the EEC Commis-
sion's proposal  to the Council for a regulation on the application of social 
- 38 -security systems to denizen workers and their families in the Community 
(Rapporteur : Mr.  Leon-Eli Troclet). 
Introductory report by Mr.  Carcaterra and discussion on the EEC Commis-
sion's proposal to the Council for a  regulation on the harmonization of certain 
social provisions in the road transport sector (Rappo'rteur : Mr.  Carcaterra). 
Internal Market Committee (5) 
Meeting of 5 December in Brussels :  Examination of and vote on the draft 
Opinion by Mr.  Tomasini to be referred to the Health Protection Committee on 
the draft directive concerning colorants used in pharmaceutical products; re-
presentatives of the EE C Commission were present. 
Discussion with the High Authority on the current state of the steel market and 
on the out come of the meeting of  the Special Council of Ministers of 22  Novem-
ber. 
Examination of the Opinion of the Legal Committee on petition no.  1/1966-67 
made by Mr.  Louis Worms requesting compensation for prejudice suffered at 
the time of the scrap-iron irregularities. 
Meeting of 20 December in Brussels :  Examination of and vote on the draft re-
port by Mr.  Berkhouwer on a draft directive concerning the suppression of 
electrical interference caused by motor vehicles.  Representatives of the 
EEC Commission were present. 
Resumption of the study of the state of the steel market and of the outcome of 
the meeting of the Special Council of Ministers of 22  November 1966.  (Rappor-
teur : Mr.  Blaisse).  Representatives of the High Authority were present. 
Transport Committee (8) 
Meeting of 5 November in Brussels :  Examination resumed of the draft report 
by Mr.  Jozeau-Marigne on the EEC Commission proposal to the Council on a 
directive concerning the standardization of regulations on the duty free entry of 
fuel in the tanks of commercial vehicles.  Discussion on the EEC Commission 
proposal to the Council on a  regulation concerning the approximation of certain 
social security provisions affecting road transport (Rapporteur : Mr.  Laan). 
Resumption of the discussion on the outlying report drawn up by Mr. Carcaterra 
on the plan for an international Rhine Shipping Union (UNIR)  and the introduc-
tion of regulations on the capacity for transport by navigable waterway. 
- 39-Research and Cultural Affairs Committee (10) 
Meeting of 19 December at Brussels :  Perusal and approval,  in the presence 
of Mr.  Carrelli,  Vice President,  and Mr.  De Groote,  member of the Euratom 
Commission,  of Opinion drawn up by Mr.  Battaglia for the Political Commit-
tee,  which is responsible in the matter,  on the characteristics and specific 
functions of Euratom following the merger of the Executives. 
Health Protection Committee (  11) 
Meeting of 20  December in Brussels  : Perusal,  in the presence of the EEC 
Commission,  of Mr.  van der Ploeg's draft report on the EEC Commission's 
proposal to the Council concerning a  directive for the approximation of Mem-
ber States' legislation on substances that may be added as colorants to pharma-
ceutical products,  and appointment of Mr. van der Ploeg as drafter of a sup-
plementary report. 
Examination and adoption,  in the presence of the EE C Commission,  of Mr. 
Hansen's draft report on the prevention of industrial accidents in the Commu-
nity. 
Discussion with the EEC Commission on the application of the right of esta-
blishment for activities in the field of health (Rapporteur : Mr.  Santero). 
Appointment of Mr.  Bergmann as Rapporteur on report on the activities of the 
Mines Safety Commission for the period 1961-65. 
Legal Committee (13) 
Meeting of 7 December in Brussels :  Resumption of study of the second part 
of the draft working paper drawn up by Mr.  Bech,  relating to the European 
Parliament's regulation. 
Discussion of consultation of the European Parliament by the Executive in the 
event of amendments to proposals already submitted to the Council (Rappor-
teur : Mr.  Jozeau-Marigne). 
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The third meeting of the Conference (Abidjan,  10-14 December 1966) 
The 3rd meeting of the Parliamentary Conference of the  Association set up by 
the Yaounde Convention was held in Abidjan from 10-14 December 1966. 
The Conference re-elected the retiring President, Mr. Lamine Gueye (Senegal) 
and constituted its bureau which now composes nine as opposed to the previous 
seven Vice-Presidents.  After the speech made by  Mr.  Lamine Gueye,  who 
thanked the Ivory Coast for the welcome it had extended to the Conference, 
Mr.  Poher, First Vice-President, took the floor. 
He began by recalling that the Conference, which had sprung from a generous 
initiative had become a well-tried experience.  To come to Africa, he said, 
enabled Europeans to realize how essential their union,in other words  their 
common vocation,  was. 
The following then spoke, Mr.  Philippe Yace,  President of the National As-
sembly of the Ivory Coast and Mr.  Denise,  representing President Houphouet-
Boigny.  The latter enumerated the measures that had to be taken as a matter 
of urgency : guarantees of markets for African products,  the stabilization of 
raw materialprices,  a cut in the costs of middle men,  a reduction in the con-
sumer tax charged by the Six on tropical products and lastly the appropriation 
of part of the income from these taxes to increase and stabilize prices.  In his 
opinion the Association should not be restricted to pursuing purely mercantile 
ends but should provide a collective answer to the problem of underdevelop-
ment. 
Mr. Ebagnitchie, a member of the Ivory Coast Parliament submitted a report (1) 
on the  annual management  accounts  of the  Conference and the  provisional 
estimates for 1967.  Then the President-in-Office of the Council of Association 
Mr.  Konan Bedie (Ivory Coast) made a statement on the second annual report 
on the activity of the Council (2).  He noted there had been an improvement in 
relations between the institutions and an improvement in trade.  Another suc-
cess had been the association of Nigeria. 
The President-in-Office of the EEC Council,  Mr.  De Block,  discussed the 
problem of taxes on tropical products and explained why it was difficult to 
abolish them. 
Mr.  Sissoko (Mali) then submitted a report (3)  for the Joint Committee on the 
second annual activity report.  He drew attention to the deterioration in the 
terms of trade  for the  African and Malagasy States  and to  the reduction in 
(~  Doc.  11/1966-67 
(2)  Doc,  9/1966-67 
(3)  Doc.  12/1966-67 
- 41-financial aid. The economic imbalance was liable to breed a new struggle be-
tween international classes. The solution lay in a  co-ordination of efforts to 
grant credit facilities to the underdeveloped countries, promote technical co-
operation and avoid discrimination between the States. The Association should 
serve as an example of how the problem of underdevelopment could be solved. 
The debate on the latter report was. then open to the floor.  Mr. Furler (Ger-
many) spoke first. He anticipated that the Conference would impart a fresh 
impetus to the Association. 
Mr. Vendroux {France) reviewed the broad outlines of the French policy for 
helping the underdeveloped countries ; in particular this provided for a ration-
alization of the foodstuffs market, the setting of primary product prices at pro-
fitable rates through international agreements and the charging of a levy on be-
half of the producing countries. France  furthermore devoted two to three per 
cent of its budget to assisting the third world. 
Mr. Metzger (Germany), for his part, explained the policy of the Federal Re-
public. He referred  particularly to coffee and banana imports, which were 
effected on a free market basis. Under these conditions, he felt that it was for 
the AAMS  to make their products more competitive. 
The main point of concern to subsequent speakers and in particular 
Mr. Kassongo (Congo) and Mr.  Boubou Hama (Niger) was the marketing of 
tropical products and price stabilization. They recalled the warning on this 
subject given by Mr. Hamani Diori, President of the AAMS.  Two speakers, 
Mr. Battaglia (Italy) and Mr.  Marigoh Mboua (Cameroon) raised the question 
of the abolition of the internal taxes charged by the Six o~  agricultural products 
imported from Africa. Mr. de Block, for his part, doubted  whether such a 
measure would be really effective. It was not certain that consumption in the 
"rich" countries could be stimulated by the abolition of these taxes. Then again 
their abolition would benefit all the producing countries and not only the AAMS. 
It had to be recognized, he concluded, that the necessary progress could only 
be made gradually. 
Speaking for the Euratom Commission, Mr. Margulies  explained the condi-
tions that had to be met before projects submitted to the EDF  could be consid-
ered. Firstly the project had to have the agreement of the beneficiary state. 
It had also to be based on preliminary studies and it had to be  such that it 
could be carried out at once, bearing in mind the local infrastructure. 
Mr. Margulies hoped that the stage of practical achievement would shortly be 
reached. 
The debate continued with speeches from various representatives of the Six 
countries and of the Associated States : Mr. van der Goes van Naters (Nethel'-
lands),  Mr. Bakour~ (Chad),  Mr. Ratsima (Madagascar),  Mr. Briot(France) 
and Mr. Sabatini (Italy).  Most of them agreed that the work done within the 
institutions of the Association had been fruitful without at the same time resol-
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ving all the problems : the development of economic relations between Europe 
and Africa, the search for markets, the stabilization of tropical product prices 
and the diversification of the economies of the AAMS. 
The solution advocated by Mr. Armengaud (France) was that there should be a 
different approach to each product.  Mr~ Alas  sane Haidara (Mali) envisaged 
regional solutions,  culminating in a world  -wide arrangement. 
Mr. Carboni (Italy) for his part said he was convinced that the organization of 
an itinerant fair in Europe would make tropical products better known. 
Mr.  Makha Sarr (Senegal) recalled that the European partners should take the 
concerns of their associates into account in international negotiations. 
Other speakers were concerned at the lack of progress within the scientific 
and cultural promotion policy : Mr. Moro (Italy) and Mr. Ahmed Gumane 
Robl~ (Somalia). 
Speaking for the High Authority and the EEC Commission, Mr. Rochereau 
gave his opinion about the criticisms made concerning financial and technical 
co-operation. 
Certain delays had resulted from the fact that the dialogue procedure was,  as 
yet,  insufficiently developed. As regards the trade expansion policy,  an at-
tempt had to be made to stabilize and to invest at one and the same time. He 
agreed that the trade had expanded favourably during the first half of 1966 ; 
there had been a real recovery but there was still some uncertainty. Quanti-
tatively speaking, the assistance rendered by the EEC could not yield benefits 
within too short a period. 
It was essential, he said, that African pro~ucts should become better known. 
The Commission would act on two principles : select major fairs and group 
the interests of several states in terms of particular products. The Commis-
sion hoped, however, that private investment would supplement the investment 
made by th.e  Community. This matter was being studied. As for internal taxes 
these were a major source of revenue which could not be cut off. Would reduc-
ing them affect consumption, he asked. The problem was a source of concern. 
It was important, he cone] uded, to organize markets together and to regularize 
prices. 
Mr. Terrenoire (France) envisaged the possibility of revising the Yaound~ 
Convention. This was based on the pri::lciple of free trade, which was mislead-
ing. The partners were politically equal but they were not economically equal. 
He found it deplorable that the economic imbalance of the underdeveloped coun-
tries was growing worse. Relations between Europe and Africa had to strike a 
note of African development. 
At the close of the meeting, the Conference unanimously adopted a  resolution 
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stressing the value of a fruitful dialogue between institutions in the interests 
of the successful operation of the Association. With regard to trade, the Con-
ference stressed the need to work out solutions leading to a growth of trade 
within the Association through a  sustained effort in the field of trade promo-
tion and asked the States to examine how far the reduction of certain int~rnal 
taxes might foster the marketing of tropical products ; it called for qction to 
solve the crucial issue of price rationalization. The Conference further re-
commended that recourse be had on loans on special terms from the fund  and 
it recommended making it easier to obtain loans from the European Investment 
Bank. It trusted that the efforts made to raise individual attainment levels and 
to train supervisory and management staff would be stepped up. Lastly, it drew 
attention to the unfortunate effects that might result if the partners failed to 
co-ordinate their action and failed to take into account their mutual interests 
and solidarity. 
- 44-II.  ASSEMBLY OF THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION 
WEU Assembly and the problems raised by the possible accession of the 
United Kingdom to the European Communities 
The WEU Assembly met from 12-15 December 1966.  Mr.  Badini Confalonieri 
(Liberal,  Italy) was elected President of the Assembly in succession to Mr. 
Carlo Schmidt (Socialist, nermany). 
After a  lengthy debate on relations between East and West Europe and on the 
problem of China,  the Assembly devoted its session of 15  December to the 
problems raised by the possible accession of the United Kingdom to the Euro-
pean Communities.  Lord Gladwyn (Liberal,  United Kingdom) submitted are-
port on behalf of the General Affairs Committee on this subject. 
The report began by dealing with the main problems that preoccupied the States 
concerned.  It went on to discuss the evolution of public opinion in Great 
Britain where there was increasing support for the idea of joining a  European 
Community.  With reference to accession procedure,  Lord Gladwyn suggested 
that there had,  first of all,  to be a statement by all concerned that there were 
no political or other objections to Britain's joining, provided only that she ac-
cepted the Treaty of Rome.  He went on to say that there would also have to be 
agreement on the length of the transitional stage during which,  on both sides of 
the Channel,  the economies could be gradually adjusted to the new situation 
which would arise following Britain's accession.  There would,  in addition, 
have to be some broad bargain,  he said,  about the ceiling for British payments 
into the Common Agricultural Fund during these transitional periods. 
Another point that would have to be settled in advance would be some continuing 
special position for certain New Zealand exports.  To this he added agreement 
on a  suitable voting formula.  He repeated that before Britain joins,  she might 
be well advised to make some declaration of intention to work towards the con-
stitution of some new European reserve currency. 
Mr.  J.  Rey,  a  member of the EEC Commission,  thought that Britain's joining 
EEC could only be thought of as the beginning of  the Community's enlarge-
ment.  Mr.  Rey pointed out that so far as the Commonwealth was concerned, 
he had no particular worries since it was on these problems that the  greatest 
degree of agreement had been reached in the 1961-63 negotiations for British 
entry.  As for agricultural problems,  these would require a great deal of effort 
and imagination.  With reference to monetary problems,  the Common Market 
Commission was unlikely to create difficulties.  He had the impression,  how-
ever, that monetary discussions would loom large in the current talks and per-
haps also in the future negotiations. 
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Gladwyn in his report.  He thought that the negotiations with Great Britain 
would take some time even if  they were restricted to the salient points,  and 
that it would be difficult for all the Governments concerned to give a final 
'yes'  before agreement were reached on a number of points. 
Mr.  Rey  concluded by stressing that the real problem was to determine what 
we were going to do together.  It was a  question of knowing,  with reference to 
being grouped together,  wherein the interests of all,  and not just Britain, lay. 
Their objective,  he said,  should be to create a free and independent Europe 
which would be an  equal partner  in the free world.  The independence of 
Europe was to be achieved by integration and depended also on the extension 
and enlargement of the Community. 
Those who  spoke in the debate stressed the importance of the accession of 
Britain and her EFTA partners to EEC.  The British spokesmen stressed that 
Britain did mean business.  Mr.  H effer (Labour) made it clear that Britain 
did not envision a  Community which would be directed by a  supranational 
authority dealing with matters of foreign affairs or defence.  In this he said 
Britain's position did not_differ from that of France. 
At the close of the debate the Assembly unanimously adopted a recommenda-
tion in which it considered that  'the accession of the United Kingdom to the 
Treaties of Paris and Rome would clearly be the best way of applying the eco-
nomic provisions of the Treaty of Brussels'  and that  'a more favourable trend 
exists now,  both in Britain and on the continent of Europe in favour of such ac-
cession '.  The Assembly considered that  the  accession of the United King-
dom to the European Communities,  by encouraging the building of Europe as a 
whole is one of the surest means of promoting a real detente in East-West re-
lations. 
The Assembly recommended that,  without waiting until Britain feels able to 
make a  second formal application to accede to the Treaties of Paris and Rome, 
the Council should at once begin consideration of the main lines of a common 
European foreign and defence policy;  it recommended that the Council exam-
ine the setting up of joint institutions with competence in the scientific and 
technological fields,  responsible,  in particular, for organizing and imple-
menting aeronautical and space research and production in Europe; it recom-
mended that the Council should further examine without delay,  and with the 
advice of the EEC Commission,  the procedure that might most suitably be 
adopted in the event of such formal application being made with a view to get-
ting agreement on only the major outstanding issues which would arise from 
the accession of the United Kingdom,. the details being gradually worked out 
with British co-operation in  the institutions of the Community during the ne-
c.essary transitional period.  (Documents of the WEU Assembly) 
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a)  Germany 
Government declaration by Federal Chancellor Kiesinger and European policy 
In a statement  before the German Bundestag on 14 December 1966 Mr.  Kiesinger 
stated that the European peoples could do far more for world peace and general 
prosperity by pooling their energies.  E~onomic and political union was as 
much in the interest of the European peoples as in that of the United States. 
He hoped that one day the Soviet Union,  too,  would see in a united Europe a 
major factor for world peace.  The will for European unity should not however 
be made an excuse for omitting to carry out what was now possible.  The Fed-
eral Government was therefore determined to do all it could for a just and last-
ing peace in Europe. 
The Federal Chancellor stressed the progress made to date by the present 
European Communities,  and added that his government would continue to back 
the further development of the European Economic Community and its institu-
tions.  The Community of the Six should be open to all European States that 
were prepared to  espouse its aims.  The new Government would particularly 
welcome the admission of Great Britain and other EFTA countries to the Euro-
pean Community. It would also press for an outward-looking commercial poli-
cy to go hand in hand with the internal development of the Common Market.  To 
that end it would do its utmost to ensure the success of the Kennedy Round. 
The Federal Chan~ellor dwelt at length on Franco-German relations.  Without 
close relations based on mutual trust between Germany and France there could 
be no peaceful order in Europe,  desired though it be in both East and West. 
Germany's attitude towards France was guided by the following considerations: 
1.  Both the geographical position and the history of Europe had led to a situa-
tion in which,  under present-day conditions,  French and German interests 
coincided to a large degree; 
2.  In common with France,  America's oldest ally in  Europe,  Germany was 
convinced of the need for a  solid alliance between the free nations of Europe 
striving for union and the United States of America,  whatever the form that 
alliance might take in a changing world.  Germany declined to be tacked in-
to  seeking a  misguided and dangerous alternative; 
3.  Like France,  Germany championed the reunification of the traditional Euro-
pean family of peoples,  a goal which entailed putting an end to the division 
of the German people,  which was both historically unsound and unnatural; 
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any other people or ':!ountry.  It sb.ould serve rather as a rallying point in 
pursuing a policy for European union.  It was essential if Europe was to be 
a responsible partner.  A Europe that spoke ' with one voice ' as American 
statesmen desired,  called for ever closer agreement between German and 
French policies.  Europe could only be built with France and Germany, 
never without - let alone in opposition - one of them.  The situation deman-
ded practical steps towards union rather than slavish pursuit of ideals. 
What was desirable but at present unattainable should not be allowed to 
stand in the way of what was practicable.  · 
5.  Franco-German co-operation in as many fields as possible was of great 
value for improving relations with countries of the Eastern bloc. 
6.  For all these reasons the Federal Government wanted to make the best 
practical  use of the scope for co-ordinating the policies of the two coun-
tries offe:r:ed by the Franco-German agreement of 22 -June  1963,  and inten-
ded to submit proposals on the subject.  The special circumstances prevail-
ing in each of the two nations would continue to bring about clashes of inter-
est and differences of opinion.  The Federal Government was convinced, 
however,  that such problems would be overshadowed by the need - vital for 
the future of both peoples and for Europe as a whole - for far-reaching eco-
nomic,  technological,  cultural,  military and political co-operation in ev·er-
widening fields. 
In the ensuing debate Dr.  Barzel,  as spokesman of the CDU/CSU Group,  stated 
that as Germany's future lay in Europe its policy would have to be a European 
one.  He  described the political union of the EEC States - with an  'open door' 
policy towards other States prepared  to enter under the same conditions - as the 
key to the major problems of the European continent and a prerequisite for its 
future political,  scientific,  technical and economic status.  There was no bet-
ter way  of ensuring the security of Europe than to work systematically for an 
integrated Europe. 
Dr.  Barzel stated that Europe  could only continue  to be built up with the co-
operation of France.  European union,  long-term security,  European peace 
policy and German reunification,  all depended on co-operation with France. 
Furthermore,  Great Britain,  too,  belonged to Europe,  and the will to enter 
the European Community was growing among its people,  a  development which 
Germany would do all it could to encourage. 
Dr.  Dehler (FDP Group)  questioned whether the same old phrases could still 
be used in speaking about Europe.  Politics in Europe had led to its becoming 
hopelessly divided.  Dr.  Dehler did not believe a bridge could ever be built 
between the EEC,  EFTA and other countries outside the Community.  The ar-
rangements already in existence were of too rigid a nature to permit that.  The 
concept of a politically integrated Europe - a goal on which the young people of 
Germany had pinned such great hope - had been wrecked.  Even the latest at-
tempt,  at least to strengthen the ties between France and Germany,  was being 
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The Government's statement had nothing to offer,  apart from generalities, 
regarding what further action should be taken.  Dr.  Dehler questioned whether 
the enormous financial sacrifices should be made without a  definite political 
aim.  He  added that the Free Democrats had had serious doubts about the 
Rome Treaties at the time,  and criticized the CDU for having wanted merely 
to create a  Catholic Europe.  He added' that the FDP had rejected the Rome 
Treaties early on because it had been clear at the time that they would only 
lead to the division of Europe and to economic difficulties. 
Foreign Minister Brandt thought two points particularly worthy of note as re-
gards West European co-operation and unification : first he pointed out that in 
the last few days the British and representatives of other EFTA States - in 
particular the Scandinavian countries - had been told in the course of WEU 
talks and on other  occasions how much their entry into the Common Market 
and the European Communities would be welcomed~  It had been arranged for 
the British Prime Minister and Foreign Minister to pay a visit to Bonn in mid-
February after their Rome and Paris visits.  Mr.  Brandt added that discus-
sions had also beenheld with Mr. Fanfani,  Italian Foreign Minister,  regarding 
greater efforts in the technological sector to close the gap between Europe and 
the USA.  (German Bundestag : 80th session,  13  December 1966,  82nd ses-
sion,  15  December 1966,  83rd session,  16 December 1966) 
b)  Italy 
Mr.  Fanfani,  Foreign Minister,  addresses the Italian Chamber of Deputies on 
technological policy and Europe 
A foreign affairs debate was held in  the Chamber of Deputies on the basis of 
motions and interpellations from various sections of the political ranks. 
Mr.  Fanfani,  Foreign Minister,  pointed out that his proposal for closing the 
technological gap between  Europe and the United States did not mean a return 
to the machinery of the Marshall Plan.  It entailed instead profitable co-ordi-
nation of technical know-how within the wider context of closer relations be-
tween East and West. 
Italy had submitted a factual  documen~ on the subject to the allied governments, 
addressing itself to the Atlantic Council which,  for the moment,  it considered 
to be the appropriate organization.  This did not rule out the possibility of fol-
lowing up this initiative elsewhere once a  suitable international body had been 
set up.  All governments who had received the document regarded the initiative 
as of prime importance.  Both at Atlantic and at European level Italy's efforts 
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The Italian government had followed a policy which,  while realistic,  had not 
abandoned the ultimate objectives of economic and political integration.  In 
Europe substantial progress was being made in shaping a far-reaching cus-
toms policy,  and a common agricultural policy.  The latter,  in particular, 
presented delicate problems to Italy which was exposed to competition from 
its European partners.  Nor would it bring home sufficiently to all concerned 
the need to prepare themselves in time for the complete liberalization of the 
European agricultural market in 1968.  Among the initiatives taken by the Ita-
lian government on European policy,  Mr.  Fanfani mentioned the efforts made 
to facilitate British membership of the EE C and to open up the Community to 
other countries that either could not,  or did not intend to become members. 
As for the Kennedy Round,  Italy had exerted itself with a view to making the 
negotiations a success,  in the knowledge that this was desirable both from the 
economic and the political point of view.  Replying to Mr.  Vecclietti and 
Luzzatto who had inquired about the possible entry intothe CommunitybySpain, 
Mr  ,Fanfani stated that the list of visits paid by him to foreign countries could 
be regarded as an outline  of Italian policy for drawing nearer to nations that 
wished to be admitted to the Common Market - for example, the United King-
dom and Denmark.  There also existed other forms of bilateral collaboration 
in addition to that of association with the Common Market.  (Chamber of Depu-
ties,  verbatim reports of debates,  18  and 19  October 1966) 
c)  Netherlands 
1.  Adoption by the First Chamber of the Treaty for the merger 
On  25  October,  in spite of the ministerial crisis, the First Chamber a9-opted 
the Treaty establishing a  single Council and a single Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities,  together with a protocol on the privileges and immunities 
of the European Communities.  Although the matter was not put forward as ur-
gent by the outgoing government,  the Chamber did not regard it as controver-
sial.  A draft motion by Mr.  Vander Spek (Socialist Peace Party) to  'postpone 
the debate to a  more suitable date and only then to decide on this bill'  was re-
jected unanimously with only three against.  Minister Luns stated that the in-
struments of ratification would not be deposed during the period of the Govern-
ment's resignation. 
During the debates Mr.  Burger (Labour Party),  Mr.  Berghuis  (Anti-Revolu-
tionary Party),  Mr.  Baas (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy), Mr. 
Van Hulst (Christian Historical Union)  and Mr.  Steenkamp (Catholic People's 
Party) stated that their respective groups would vote for the law approving the 
Treaty.  Mr.  Burger pointed out that when the last minister deposed the instru-
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ments of ratification (Article 9)the three executives would  disappear. Ifmem-
bers of the new commission were not appointed at the same time this would 
result in a situation where members of the old Executives would retain their 
mandate without the basis for the exercise of this,  namely the existence of the 
Executives themselves.  This would result in a vacuum.  It was therefore es-
sential for all parties to be fully in agrE;ement on the application of the Treaty 
before depositing the instruments of ratification. 
Mr.  Baas regretted that democratization of the Communities had had to suffer 
so much from trends in European affairs.  According to Mr.  Van Hulst,  how-
ever,  rejection of the Treaty on the merger would in no way serve the cause 
of democratization.  (First Chamber 1966-67 session,  sitting of 25  October 
1966) 
2.  European policy 
On  28  December Mr.  Luns,  Foreign Minister,  made the following statement 
before the Second Chamber of the States General during the debate on his mi-
nistry's budget : 
'Fully conscious as it is of the worth of Western civilization and of the free-
doms it had acquired at the cost of great sacrifices,  and convinced of the need 
to round it off and develop it still further,  the Government is determined to go 
on striving for a truly integrated,  outward-looking and democratic Europe. 
One of the aims both of Atlantic and of European collaboration is to ward off 
any form of nationalism,  particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
while reserving for our neighbours in the East a place in the political,  econo-
mic and military organizations already in existence,  where all partners have 
a chance of co-operating as equals without any discrimination and under a sys-
tem integrated to the highest possible degree.  Europe will know no real peace 
until the problem of Germany's division has been solved . . .  A sound solution 
must be based on the right of the German people as a whole to decide their own 
future ... The West cannot recognize the artificial construction in East Ger-
many known as the German Democratic Republic because this would be to 
sanction a police regime which,  with the backing of Soviet troops,  keeps mil-
lions of Germans under restraint . . .  German reunification must be carried 
out - and on  this point all the Western countries are in agreement - as part of 
a general settlement of the problem of European security that also includes 
suitable disarmament  measures . . .  Sight should not be lost,  however,  of the 
fact that no real progress can be made without the co-operation of the Soviet 
Union.  Closer and more numerous contacts between the peoples of Western 
and Eastern Europe will not automatically induce the Soviet Government to 
adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards the problems of Central Germany.' 
-51 -Eastern Europe was now on the move.  This applied both to internal develop-
ments in all these countries (including the Soviet Union)  and to their re.cipro-
cal relations.It was interesting to see how the desire for a more practical and 
less ideological approach to econo.mic problems was gaining ground.  The re-
gimes of Eastern Europe had neither the intention- in their own interests,  of 
course - nor,  perhaps,  the means to break the close bonds that still tied  them 
to the Soviet Union.  It was to be hoped that the present trend would finally es-
tablish itself,  that the day would come when the degree of rapprochement be-
tween East and  West would be such as to permit really normal co-operatio~ 
free from mistrust or ulterior motives.  The Netherlands Government inten-
ded to work actively with this end in view.  Mr.  Luns pointed out that in coun-
tries with a  Communist regime the influence of internal affairs on foreign po-
licy was far less marked than in countries of the West.  A measure of free-
dom from restrictions at home did not automatically lead to greater flexibility 
or moderation in foreign policy. 
Replying to Mr.  Blaisse (Catholic People's Party),  who wished to know wheth-
er the Netherlands Government felt there was any chance of relaunching the 
political dialogue in Europe,  Mr.  Luns stated that owing to the persisting dif-
ferences of opinion - particularly between France and the other member Sta-
tes of the European Community - on the principles of Atlantic and European 
co-operation,  it was doubtful whether an attempt to step up political contacts 
between the Six would serve much purpose at the moment.  He saw no reason 
why the Six should not exchange political views in Rome next spring on the oc-
casion of the commemoration of the signing of the European Treaties.  He en-
visaged these discussions as taking the form of desultory talks involving no 
commitment and similar to those once planned for Venice.  This,  Mr.  Luns 
thought was the· direction in which things were tending. 
It was on  the initiative of the Netherlands - although at Community level -
that the first talks had been held between the Six on the new move of the Unit-
ed Kingdom to enter the EEC.  These discussions had,  of.course,  been on the 
superficial side so far because the British Prime Minister and Foreign Minis-
ter had not yet completed their tour.  At all events it had been decided that 
the EEC Commission should be informed of the conversations held by the Bri-
tish representatives in the various capitals. 
During preparations for the study of the national budget for 1967,  Mr.  Luns 
had already declared,  in a memorandum dated 21  December,  that the new 
Netherlands Government would not depose the deed ratifying the Treaty on the 
merger until the composition of the European Commission had been satisfac-
torily settled. 
During the public debate Mr.  Luns stated that he had again drawn the attention 
of his colleagues in other governments,  during the last meeting of the Council, 
to the problem of the composition of the new Commission,  and had urged that 
an end should be put to the state of retirement that at present applied  to most 
of the members of the European Executives.  If, at least,  for the moment, 
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reinstated in their present functions.  (Debates of the Second Chamber of the 
States General 1966-67 session,  sitting of 28  December 1966).  Memorandum 
concerning report (sent on 21  December 1966),  No.  17,  session 1966-67 -
8800,  national b~dget for 1967,  Chapter V,  External Affairs)  · 
3.  Social harmonization in the EEC 
In reply to questions put by the Standing Committee on Social Affairs and Pub-
lic Health (Doc.  No.  16),  Mr.  Veldkamp,  Minister for Social Affairs and 
Public Health,  stated in a  memorandum addressed to the Second Chamber on 
20 December 1966 that despite all the valuable studies carried out by the 
European Commission the  Governments concerned had taken no concrete 
steps to approximate their respective social systems stage by stage. 
This situation was due to a number of factors.  The main one had at one time 
certainly been the almost total absence of trust between the Governments and 
the Commission in the social sector.  Taking advantage of his term of office 
in the previous six months,  Mr.  Veldkamp had tried to overcome this crisis 
of confidence which in previous years had led to an impasse in the social sec-
tor which had recently  been sharply criticized by the European Parlia·-
ment.  Mr.  Veldkamp's initiative had resulted in the Ministers for Social Af-
fairs of member States arranging a  meeting on 19 December  1966 for the 
first time in two years. The subjects to be discussed would include a practical 
approach to the harmonization of social security systems.  (Session of 1966-
67- 8800,  national budget for 1967,  Chapter XV,  social affairs and public 
health.  Memo concerning reports (despatched on 20  December 1966),  No.  18) 
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